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⑥ THE ARAB - ISRAELI CONFLICT:
A STUDY OF GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL INTERACTION

by

① Gregory M. Kortanek

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a Study of Global and Regional Interaction

by

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
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
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

_____ Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION-----	9
	SYSTEMS -----	10
	DOMINANCE -----	11
	DEFINITIONS PECULIAR TO THIS STUDY -----	12
	RESEARCH FORMAT -----	13
	NOTES I -----	15
II.	COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE -----	16
	HISTORICAL DESTINY -----	17
	RELIGIOUS IRREDENTISM -----	18
	MUTUAL NON-RECOGNITION -----	19
	NOTES II -----	25
III.	THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT: A SYSTEM DOMINANT "BALANCE OF POWER" INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM -----	27
	THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT -----	28
	ZIONISM AND THE WESTERN POWERS -----	31
	WARTIME POLITICAL MANEUVERING -----	36
	THE BALFOUR DECLARATION -----	38
	DEVELOPING PATTERNS OF MUTUAL EXPLOITATION ----	41
	ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANDATE -----	43
	NOTES III -----	47

IV.	SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A DISINTEGRATING "BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM	51
	THE ARAB REBELLION	52
	THE PEEL COMMISSION	54
	PROTOTYPE OF CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS	56
	REGIONAL REACTION	58
	MOBILIZATION OF ZIONIST FORCES	59
	WORLD WAR II	62
	THE DEVOLUTION OF BRITISH POWER IN PALESTINE ----	65
	THE UNITED NATIONS AND PALESTINE	66
	THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL	69
	THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	70
	THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	75
	NOTES IV	80
V.	DEFINED SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A BIPOLAR/ POLITICALLY DISCONTINUOUS INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	84
	ARAB POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY ----	84
	EFFECTS OF THE 1948 WAR ON THE "CONFRONTATION STATES"	85
	Jordan	85
	Egypt	87
	Syria	87
	Lebanon	88

	THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISRAELI NATIONAL ACTOR ----	89
	CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS -----	91
	CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM -----	92
	THE SUEZ CONFLICT -----	95
	SUEZ AFTERMATH: SOME THOUGHTS ON LINKAGE POLITICS -----	102
	1956-1967 -----	105
	THE THIRD ROUND -----	114
	EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON REGIONAL/SYSTEMIC RELATIONS -----	116
	NOTES V -----	119
VI.	EMERGING PATTERNS OF SUBSYSTEM DOMINANCE -----	124
	TERRITORIAL THRUSTS AND DIPLOMATIC PARRIES -----	124
	ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION 1968-1971 -----	128
	THE WAR OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT -----	132
	THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR -----	140
	SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE -----	141
	MIDDLE EAST OIL -----	143
	ARMS TRANSFERS REVISITED -----	147
	SUBSYSTEMIC POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE -----	150
	NOTES VI -----	158
VII.	SOME CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES -----	161
	ARMS TRANSFER POLICY -----	164
	NEED FOR AN AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY -----	165

PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB - ISRAELI PEACE	167
NOTES VII	170
VII. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	171
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	176

ABSTRACT

This study of the Arab - Israeli conflict traces its historical development in the context of an evolving international system. Numerous examples have been used to illustrate the changing manner in which the core dispute of the Middle Eastern regional subsystem has influenced or been influenced by the global system. The trend which emerges is towards an increasingly subsystem dominant relationship between the global and the regional actors. The factors identified as influencing this trend are (1) the arms transfer policies of the major systemic actors, (2) the increasing systemic dependence upon Middle East Oil, and (3) the growing sense of political independence amongst the regional actors.

The study concludes that the Arab - Israeli conflict can only be resolved within the framework of the essential rules of behavior of the subsystem, and that a systemically imposed settlement is unlikely. Some United States policy alternatives are suggested which are designed to facilitate the resumption of direct negotiations between the regional conflict partners.

I. INTRODUCTION

The mutual antipathy which has characterized modern Arab-Jewish relations has endured since the time of the first Alliyah of 1882, through two world wars, the transformation of the international social system, the Arab Revolt, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the emergence of the global superpowers. Numerous attempts have been made by both regional and extra-regional actors to mollify the antagonists and to achieve lasting peace and stability in the Middle East region. Yet, despite the transitory euphoria which has accompanied the more dramatic of these attempts, the conflict remains intractable. This very persistence of the conflict provides some indication of its profundity and complexity. The problem is so complex, moreover, that any attempt to catalogue, much less interpolate, the many interwoven factors (often normatively charged) which have been described in the literature would produce a work which is both unwieldy, and of little value to the decision maker. Consequently, this paper will attempt to objectively analyze the dispute as a process susceptible to the abstractions which systems theories enable.

This paper is drawn in major part from the concepts expounded and defined by Morton Kaplan in his System and Process in International Politics.¹ Some modifications of Kaplan's theory and definitions have been made in order to accommodate the purposes to which this paper has been directed. The following few pages, therefore, will briefly summarize

some of the basic relevant definitions and assumptions used by Kaplan, as well as indicating what adaptations have been made by this author in his use of Kaplan's concepts.

SYSTEMS

According to Kaplan, a system of action may be defined thus:

"... a set of variables so related, in contrast to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables."²

This set may then be analyzed in terms of its "state" - a description of the variables of the system. The state is described when the observer has delineated the system's "essential rules" and its "transformation rules," when the actors in the system have been classified, and when capability and information factors have been delineated.

Kaplan goes on to define political systems as those which are distinguished by the fact that their rules:

"... specify the areas of jurisdiction for all other decision making units and provide methods for settling conflicts of jurisdiction."³

Conversely, where no supreme delimiter of jurisdictional competences exists, there is no political system. Kaplan therefore denies political nature to an international normative⁴ order:

"Since no arbiter is available to keep jurisdictional disputes within any given bounds, the system lacks full political status. In the present international system, the nation states have political systems, but the international system lacks one. Alternatively, the international system may be characterized as a null political system."⁵

DOMINANCE

Political systems may be classified into two types: system dominant or subsystem dominant. Furthermore, they may be either directive or non-directive in character. The first qualification is based upon economics. In an open market environment, an individual actor is unable to influence the price level by his own actions. In other circumstances - an oligopolistic market for example - the actions of one actor may have an appreciable effect upon the terms of trade. In the case of political systems, the distinction is the degree to which individual actors in the system, or its subsystems, are able to change the system's "essential rules."

"The political system is dominant over its subsystems to the extent that the essential rules of the political system act as parametric "givens" for any single subsystem. A subsystem becomes dominant to the extent that the essential rules of the system cannot be treated as parametric givens for that subsystem."⁷

It should be noted that in the above quotation Kaplan has explicitly referred only to political systems as being system or subsystem dominant. However, he then goes on to describe the international system in these terms:

"The international system - as it has been known for the past several hundred years - tends toward the subsystem dominant role. However, there are a number of major or essential subsystems, namely the major national states, which enter into an equilibrium somewhat like that of an oligopolistic market."⁸

For the purposes of this paper, the seeming contradiction in ascribing the attributes of a political system to the international system which

Kaplan describes as lacking a political system will be ignored. Furthermore, the second distinction, referring to the directive or non directive character of the system will also be explored only in passing, as the need arises.

DEFINITIONS PECULIAR TO THIS STUDY

Accepting Kaplan's statement that "The system consists of the variables under investigation. It has no absolute status,"⁹ this paper will utilize terminology unique to its purposes. Therefore in the context of this study, the international system will consist of that set of relationships between the major national and supra-national actors as may have a profound effect upon the essential rules of the system. Consequently, the question of whether the present system contains a political system in the sense of an arbiter of jurisdiction amongst the actors in the system is not addressed. The international system, therefore, requires the participation of those "essential national actors" which Kaplan describes in his "Balance of Power" system as well as the other national or supra-national actors who interact with them. In a "Loose Bipolar Bloc"¹¹ system, these "systemic" actors consist of the leaders of the respective blocs, as well as those actors which are able to exercise independent influence upon the actions of the bloc actors. Other national and supra-national actors play two roles simultaneously. They are coupled to the global system by means of their relationship with the systemic actors. On the other hand, to the extent that their external relations are amongst actors in the same geographic and economic spheres, they are subsystemic actors.

A system dominated international system refers to that system in which the essential actors (either major national actors or leading bloc actors) are able to influence and constrain the behavior of non essential/non bloc actors within their geographic, economic, or political subsystems. Conversely, a subsystem dominated system refers to that system in which the subsystemic actors interact with the systemic actors according to the essential behavioral rules of the subsystem on issues concerning the internal activities of their particular subsystem and its relation to the larger system.

It should be noted that the notion of dominance is treated in this paper in a manner somewhat akin to Oran Young's political discontinuity model,¹² since it "stresses the importance of both the systemwide and the regional factors and emphasizes the complex patterns of their interpenetration, leaving room for shifting weights with regard to the question of which type of factor is dominant The discontinuities model focuses on the complex interpenetrations between universal and regional issues" ¹³

RESEARCH FORMAT

This paper will trace the Arab - Israeli conflict through the transformation of the international system from the "Balance of Power" type which existed prior to the First World War, through the Loose Bipolar System which emerged after the Second World War, to the perhaps "Very Loose Bipolar System"¹⁴ or "multipolar" system which exists today. Further, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the shifting patterns of

dominance, from system dominant, through subsystemic challenge, to subsystem dominant. Finally, some policy implications of the current subsystemically dominated relationship of the United States to the regional subsystem will be discussed.

Before beginning an historically ordered survey, however, a brief outline of some of the cognitive aspects of the dispute -- aspects which are in large part responsible for the uniqueness of the Middle East subsystem -- is in order.

NOTES - I

1. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley Sons, 1957)
2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 14.
4. Kaplan's basic definition of the political follows a legal approach. The political system is first a body of rules, and therefore a normative order.
5. Kaplan, p. 14, Emphasis added.
6. The "Essential Rules" describe the general behavior of the actors.
7. Kaplan, p. 16.
8. Ibid., p. 17.
9. Ibid., p. 12.
10. Ibid., pp. 22-36.
11. Ibid., p. 36-43.
12. Oran Young, "Political Discontinuities in the International System," World Politics (April, 1968) pp. 369-392.
13. Ibid.
14. Kaplan, "Some Problems of International Research," in International Political Communities, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966) pp. 486-494.

II. COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE

In recent years, much has been written by experts in the field of international relations concerning the role of cognition, or perception in relations among nations. It appears now that these relations are, in a large measure, based upon what people think they are: the gap between reality and imagination sometimes assuming great, and possibly dangerous proportions.¹ When decision makers carry their fictions into the global arena and respond to them rather than to objective reality, the chances for rational and pragmatic policies decrease. Misperceptions affect domestic politics as well, but they are, because of more tenuous lines of communications and usually only partial feedback, much more likely in international politics. Several recent studies have shown that struggles between the most powerful nations in the contemporary world were conducted substantially in the realm of fantasy, further straining already great tensions and blocking avenues of accommodation.² Conducted on the basis of unrealistic and often prejudicial perceptions of adversaries and self, struggles of powers thus assumed certain anomic, disorienting qualities. The inability to accurately predict an opponent's behavior normally leads to a retrenching of previously stated positions and furthers rigidity, since the incentive for maintaining accepted beliefs, however at variance from reality, leads to a disregard for conflicting evidence. The curious intransigence on the part of the regional protagonists in the Middle

East confrontation between Arab and Jew can perhaps be partly explained by this phenomenon.

HISTORICAL DESTINY

One of the major complications of any discussion concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict is the fact that neither side is capable of viewing itself or its adversary with any measure of objectivity. Traditional concepts of mediation and compromise are not operative in the confrontation environment because of the special place in which each protagonist holds both himself and his "enemy." Both the Arabs and the Israelis have exhibited a common tendency to view themselves in a very special historical role. Unlike the nationalism that has influenced Europe and North America over the past century, the conflicting nationalisms of the Middle East seem to conceptualize the roles of their respective peoples as that of playing out historically ordained roles in human destiny.

At the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict are the claims of two Semetic peoples to the same land. According to Hebrew Tradition, the Lord God promised Abraham: "And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein Thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession."⁴ Unfortunately, both the Jews and the Arabs claim Abraham as a common forefather. Consequently, it is felt that Ellis⁵ errs when he states that, "The Arab connection to Palestine began centuries after the Jews had been thrust out. In the seventh century A. D." Without even exploring the factual aspect of the statement, it seems

clear that the Arabs perceive their claim to Palestine to be at least coincidental with the claims of the Israelis. On the other hand there has been some discussion concerning the possibility that the European Zionists have no claim as heirs to the promise to Abraham and, in fact, are not a Semitic people at all.⁶ The point of course is that, for the participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the truth, and consequently, the righteousness of their position, lies not with objective historicism, but with their respective ethnic myths.

RELIGIOUS IRREDENTISM

Consequently, the irredentism which attends the Arab-Israeli dispute is less the result of a political dislocation of a people from the land which they had previously occupied, but a separation of a people (whether Jew during the diaspora, or Palestinian Arab today) from a land inextricably linked with its basic religious tenets. As Lichtenstadter states:

"One might think religion and politics to be incompatible, but in the history of the Near and Middle East, from time immemorial religion and the state idea were closely allied. They were, in fact interchangeable, almost identical.

"In ancient Egypt, the king was god and god was the king, and the land itself was linked to king and god ...

"In ancient Israel we have the same close connection between religion and the ruler. The King of Israel was guided by God Muhammed, the Prophet of Islam, continued in the same vein insofar as he was conscious of having been called God to reveal God's word to his people."⁷

This shared, while mutually exclusive claim to the land, helps explain a paradoxical aspect of the dispute: although both sides evidence great hostility towards one another, the majority of their attitudes tend to parallel each other.⁸ Further, Kerr states that while all nationalisms are, in a sense, religions based upon political aspirations and perceptions, Jewish and Arab nationalisms have arisen out of their respective religious traditions and are, perhaps, "as much unbroken extensions as surrogates of religious sentiment. This may help account for the special measure of self-righteousness by which both sides distinguish themselves."⁹

MUTUAL NON RECOGNITION

Some indication of the perceptual chasm which separates the opposing factions in this dispute may be derived from the following two quotations regarding the problem of the Palestinian refugees and their claim to the land:

"I do not deny that the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that this is a hardship. That is not a hardship on any race, any nation possessing so many national states and so many more national states in the future. One fraction, one branch of the race, and not a big one, will have to live in someone else's state; well that is the case with all the mightiest nations of the world. I could hardly mention one of the big nations, having their states mighty and powerful, who had not one branch living in someone else's state. That is only normal and there is no "hardship" attached to that. So when we hear the Arab claim confronted with the Jewish claim - I fully understand that any minority would prefer to be a majority. It is quite understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also prefer Palestine to be the Arab state No. 4, 5 or 6 - that I quite understand but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation."¹⁰

"I begin to lose my patience and my sense of rationality. I begin to feel that our lives are not worth living anywhere in the world, anywhere. It is impossible for me to be oblivious of my situation; to be, as it were, happy. Moments of gloom and fury overwhelm my being as I spend restless days in Paris and I see pictures of robust Israelis tilling our land, growing our oranges, inhabiting our cities and towns, co-opting our culture, and talking in their grim, stubborn way about how we do not "exist" and how our country was a "desert" before they went there. And I gag with anger and mortification . . .

"After twenty-five years of living in the ghourba, of growing up perpetually reminded of my status as an exile, the diaspora for me, for a whole generation of Palestinians, becomes the homeland. Palestine is no longer a mere geographic entity but a state of mind. The reason however, that Palestinians are obsessed with the notion of Returning, though indeed there is no Palestine to return to as it was a quarter-century before, is because the Return means the reconstitution of a Palestinian's integrity and the regaining of his place in history. It is not merely for a physical return to Palestine that a lot of men and women have given or dedicated their lives, but for the right to return of which they have been robbed." ¹¹

While it may be difficult for an objective observer to equate the impassioned statement of Turki to Jabotinsky's claim that the Palestinians endured no "hardship," the preceding examples are but indicative of the caricatured images to which each side ascribes its adversary. In general, there has been little serious inquiry on the part of members of one side into the reality, character, and modus vivendi of the other. The problem is basically one of mutual non-recognition. This non-recognition goes beyond the merely political aspects of diplomatic recognition and touches on the problem of each side failing to recognize the other's existence as three dimensional human beings like themselves. Instead,

we find Arabs tending to think of Jews as Zionist pawns of Western colonialism whose only goal in Palestine is "expansionism," and each Israeli retaliatory raid, and each Arab-Israeli war has strengthened that belief. Consequently, there is widespread belief amongst the Arabs that "the only thing the Israelis understand is force," and since they cannot be brought to reason, the only alternative is to wait until Israel's foreign patrons, particularly the United States, decrease their support, both political and financial.¹²

Because of this belief in the Israeli goal of expansion, the Arabs also view with concern the Jews living outside the borders of Israel. Should the Zionists succeed in attracting the Jews to immigrate to Israel, the borders would have to be expanded simply to accommodate them.

Because of these stereotyped images perceived by the Arabs, there is a certain lack of curiosity on their part about their Jewish neighbors. Although the internal political system of Israel is made up of divergent factions, the Arab view of Israel tends more toward that of a unitary rational actor, and a malevolent one at that.

From the Israeli point of view, the question of non-recognition centers on the case of the Palestinian refugees, and the issue of whether or not they constitute a nation. The most prevalent position amongst Israeli officials is that the Palestinians can only be recognized as Arab individuals who happened to live in the area designated as a British mandate before 1948; as a result, their future lies as individuals to be assimilated into surrounding Arab states and not as a political entity.¹³

This non-recognition of a viable Palestinian nation is a logical response to the Palestinians' non-recognition of the right of Jewish immigration during the mandate period. Further, recognition of a Palestinian Arab nation separate from that which the Israelis already claim, exists as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would limit the options available to the Israelis on the politically sensitive issue of the disposition of the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza strip.

Kerr attributes this Israeli non-recognition of a Palestinian Arab nation as going much deeper than practical politics and involving the psychological needs of the Israelis to justify their continued immigration into the mandated territory and the displacement of the Palestinian Arabs, despite the Balfour Declaration's admonition that "... nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine ..."¹⁴ This justification came as the result of minimizing the social and national reality of Arab Palestine. It is easier, consequently, for the Israelis to perceive of the Palestinians as an unfortunate, non-political mass of people, manipulated by their own leaders, who fled in 1948 for unnecessary reasons and who are more logically destined for assimilation into neighboring states than for repatriation to their former home.

If there is a problem of non-recognition amongst the regional parties of the conflict, this problem is even more profound amongst the Jewish communities outside Israel, particularly in the United States, where distance and cultural barriers make it difficult to think of the Middle East

other than in terms of Israel's problems and interests. This factor is significant, and will be touched on later in this paper, when the domestic factors influencing the United States' attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict are discussed.

As for the rest of the Arab world, the Israeli counterpart of the Arab's view of them as expansionist, is the Israeli view that the Arabs are "exterminationist," and that this 100 million Arab fanatics lie in wait for the proper moment at which to strike and at which to "push the Israelis into the sea." This view of Arab intentions is expressed by Yigal Allon as follows:

"But of primary importance are the subjective asymmetric factors affecting relations between the two sides. In this respect, there is absolute polarization. Whereas the Arab states seek to isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world's map, Israel's aim is simply to live in peace and good relations with all its neighbors."

As a result of the Israeli's perception of the Arabs as failing to possess the complexities and diverse interests which one might normally ascribe to a collection of over 130 million people in 21 states, there is a lack of curiosity on the Israeli side concerning the Arabs which tends to parallel the aforementioned Arab lack of curiosity concerning the Israelis. As long as the major protagonists in this dispute tend to view each other in these stereotypical terms, the prospects for genuine movement towards a negotiated settlement of differences and the establishment of peace and normal relations between states appear dim. This is especially so if one

expects the progress towards peace to occur totally within a regional framework and with no extra regional involvement.

The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the emotionally and normatively charged atmosphere within which subsystemic interaction occurs. In the following chapters an historical survey, utilizing some of the tools of systems theory, will characterize the various types of relationships which have existed between the global system and this unique subsystem.

NOTES - II

1. Kerr, Malcolm H., "The Arabs and Israelis: Perceptual Dimensions to their Dilemma," in Beling, W.A. (ed) The Middle East, Quest for an American Policy.
2. Alroy, Gil Carl, Behind the Middle East Conflict, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975, p. 11.
3. See especially Stoessinger, John G., Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, America (New York : Random House, 1971) and Holsti, Ole R., "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy : Dulles and Russia," Enemies in Politics, eds. Finlay, David J. et al, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.
4. Genesis 17:18
5. Ellis, Harry B., The Dilemma of Israel, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
6. See especially, Koestler, Arthur, The Thirteenth Tribe, New York, Random House, 1976 for a study linking Eastern European Jewery to the ancient Khazan Empire.
7. Lichtenstadter, Ilse, "Religion as a Cultural and Political Factor in the Middle East - Past and Present" in Finger, Seymour M., (ed) The New World Balance and Peace in the Middle East : Reality or Mirage? Cranburg, New Jersey, Associated University Press, Inc., 1973, p. 137. (emphasis mine)
8. Kerr, Op cit, p. 4.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Jabotinsky, Vladimir, Testimony before British Royal Commission, 1937, as quoted by Laqueur, Walter, "Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?" Commentary, March 1976, pp. 28-33.
11. Turki, Fawaz, The Disinherited, Journal of a Palestinian Exile New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 169, pp. 175-176.
12. Kerr, Op cit, p. 10.

13. Ibid., p. 12.

14. Balfour Declaration, cited in Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca, Cornell U. Press, 1962, p. 81.

15. Allon, Yigal, Israel : "The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs, October 1976, p. 38.

III. THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT : A SYSTEM DOMINANT "BALANCE OF POWER" INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

As the seeds of the present Arab-Israeli dispute were being sown, from approximately the last half of the nineteenth century until about 1935, events within the Middle Eastern regional subsystem were being shaped and directed by extra-regional powers. These powers operated within an international system to which Kaplan appended the appellation "Balance of Power." Within this system the actors are international actors of the subclass "national actor," some of whom (at least five or more) are considered "essential."¹ Kaplan does not define "essential," however, within the context of this paper essential actors will be synonymous with "systemic actors," that is those actors whose foreign policy output may influence the behavior of other international actors outside of the geographic, economic, or political region of the systemic actor.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, the dominant Middle East regional actor, made its first attempts at joining the exclusive group of systemic actors. The Empire was at war with Russia and Austria; consequently it concluded treaties with Sweden, which was also at war with Russia, in 1789, and Prussia, which could apply pressure on Austria, in 1790. In 1798, the Empire joined a coalition against the menace of the French Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Empire, in decline, allied itself with France,

Britain, and finally Germany, in an attempt to defend itself from Russia, which it considered its natural enemy, and which indeed continued to display aggressive behavior.²

Thus, it may be seen that the behavior of the Ottoman Turks was in conformance with the essential rules of the "balance of power" system, as they formed alliances and shifted loyalties in order to advance their national interests. Nonetheless, the power of the Empire continued to decline, pressured as it was from both without and within. Consequently, although the Empire may have initially evidenced the behavior and power of an essential actor, it is clear that it was not viewed as such by the western systemic powers. Rule six of Kaplan's system calls for the essential actors to permit a defeated or constrained essential actor to reenter the system as an acceptable role partner, or to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification.³ Rather than do this, however, the Ottoman Empire was eventually to be carved up out of existence by the other essential actors, and the power vacuum left by its disappearance filled by those very powers.

At the very time that the Ottoman Empire was shrinking and becoming increasingly ineffective both a regional and a systemic actor, a new actor was emerging, a supranational actor, born in Europe, destined to play a major role in the Middle East subsystem.

THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

In nineteenth century Europe, feelings of nationalism among European Jews began to take on concrete manifestations. Kedourie⁴

states that "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century," yet the principle may reach back at least as far as the time of Saul, the first Hebrew King. As the century progressed, and the Jews prospered, hostility towards them began to increase. As Boulding⁵ points out a possible reaction to a threat is avoidance, or the principle that the capability of threat is a declining function of the distance of the threatener from the threatened. He suggests that one might interpret the foundation of Israel, in part, as a move to increase the distance between Jews and their possible threateners. In addition, the nineteenth century European nationalist movements made Jews aware of the analogies between nationalism and the traditional Jewish self-image. The nationalistic uprisings of the central and Eastern Europeans, for example, were a stimulus for arguments that the divinely appointed time had come for the Jews to seek their own liberation also - by returning to the traditional Holy Land.⁶

On 3 March 1881, Czar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated. The murder fanned the smoldering embers of anti-semitism and a new series of Pogroms was begun. Eventually, over 160 Russian cities would be devastated.⁷ Jewish communities were harassed by the "May Laws," a set of loosely interpreted, restrictive laws against the Jews by which they could be evicted from the villages, businesses, schools, and towns.⁸ Multitudes of Jews fled Russia, and, of these, thousands fled to Palestine. The first "wave" or Alliyah, as the Jews later began to call the large groups of immigrants to Palestine, was thus the result

of the pogroms which flooded Russia in 1881. These pogroms were to be the major impetus behind the Hovevie Zion, or "lovers of Zion" organization, which looked upon the resettlement of Palestine as the fundamental condition for the rejuvenation of the Jewish people.⁹ The mass return of the Jews to their homeland had begun, and the seeds of what we now call the Arab-Israeli conflict had been sown.

It was during the period of the first Alliyah that the Zionist movement began to grow to maturity. Theodore Herzl emerged as the movement's leader. He was convinced that the gentiles would never permit the Jews to be assimilated into Western European society. As long as they remained a minority, he reasoned, and subject to the political policies of a people who could change in but a few years from friend to enemy, the Jews could expect only a continuation of the suppressed existence they had endured for centuries. His Der Judenstaat (the Jewish State) was written with the objective of stirring Jews to action. He was instrumental in organizing the First Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland, in August, 1897.¹⁰ At this conference, attended by hundreds of Zionists, Herzl's personality united and mobilized the previously inchoate group into action.¹¹ The result of this meeting was the Basle Program, the ultimate goal of which was the creation in Palestine of a homestead for the Jewish people secured by public law.¹²

Note the elasticity of the wording. The convention called for a homestead "Heimstatts" secured by "public" law. This vagueness was

designed to forestall international complications as well as to unite diverse factions within the Zionist movement. Herzl had convinced the congress to say "public law" for the Ottoman Sultan would have read "international law" as a call to dismember his empire.¹³ It appears, however, that the use of the term "public law" also entails the question of whose public law. It is felt that this wording recognized the premise that if the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine were to be sanctioned by the public law of an essential actor, it would have the capability to impose that goal on the subsystemic actors. In a "balance of power" international system there is no "international law" other than that which can be imposed by the dominant states upon the dominated.

Thus, the emerging Zionist movement may be seen as prefiguring the present day concept of International non-Governmental Organizations (INGO's).¹³ It emerged as a diffuse supra-national actor closely coupled with the internal political systems of the various national actors from whose populations its memberships was drawn.

ZIONISM, AND THE WESTERN POWERS

Zionism, as an emerging international actor, conformed well to the essential rules of the Balance of Power system. Although not an essential power itself, it proceeded to form a pattern of shifting alliances based upon which of the essential powers was conceived as increasing its influence over the international system. This behavior closely parallels that required by the first essential rule: "Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight."

"The urgent task of the 1880s and 90's was one which fell far short of the Zionist ideal and yet was fundamental to the activities of both the Eastern Zionists and the Western Jews: merely to keep the doors of Palestine open to Jewish immigrants and procure the right to buy land and settle it. All was agreed in their willingness to adopt any legal or semi legal arrangement or subterfuge that would accomplish these ends in the Ottoman Empire."¹⁵

With the publication of Der Judenstaat, there was both a polarizing and a mobilizing effect upon the world Jewish community. The Jews were threatened with increased anti-Semitism because of its postulate that Jews could not assimilate. Further, its emphasis upon a statehood which would arise in an area - preferably Palestine - which would be either granted or sold by an imperial power, added to distrust of the Jews amongst the subject territories. On the other hand, Herzl's influence had led to a merger of what was previously an Eastern European movement with Westerners of Herzl's persuasion, and Palestinian settlers.¹⁶ As a result of this merger, the Zionist movement began to favor direct diplomatic intervention with the sultan so as to secure "an open agreement by which autonomous Jewish colonization of Palestine on a larger scale might take place."¹⁷ One factor which was ignored, however, was that Arabs, like other national groups within the Ottoman Empire, were already challenging the very basis of the Porte's claim to dominate its various national components.

The first essential actor to which the Zionists turned in search of support was Germany. In October 1898 Herzl wrote:

"To live under the protection of strong, great, moral, splendidly governed and thoroughly organized Germany is certain to have most salutary effect upon the national character of the Jews. Also, at one stroke we should obtain a completely legalized internal and external status. The suzerainty of the Porte and the protectorate under Germany, surely ought to be adequate legal underpinning."¹⁸

At a time when Germany was drawing close to the Ottoman Empire, the likelihood of successful German influence with Constantinople seemed most encouraging. During a meeting of Herzl and Friedrich, Grand Duke of Baden, and uncle of the Kaiser, the Grand Duke revealed some of the secret imperial designs of the Kaiser. The Kaiser's pilgrimage to the Holy Land was a political journey camouflaged as a religious act; his real purpose was to consolidate and extend German influence in the area. Consequently, the Kaiser was to have talks with the sultan and, according to the advice given him by the Grand Duke, take up Herzl's cause with the sultan. Elon reports that the Grand Duke said to Herzl "German influence in Constantinople is now unlimited. . . England has been crowded out completely, to say nothing of the other powers . . . If our Kaiser drops one word to the Sultan, it will certainly be heeded."¹⁹

Although Herzl accompanied the Kaiser on his trip and met with him at both Constantinople and Jerusalem, it soon became clear that the Kaiser was not about to push the Zionist cause over the sultan's antipathy, much more important was obtaining the concession for the Baghdad railroad and further penetrating the middle east region to the detriment of the plans of his systemic rivals, particularly England.²⁰

In 1901, Herzl approached Abdul Hamid, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, directly, in search of a charter for his Jewish state. Herzl proposed that he and his rich Jewish supporters would bail the Ottomans out of the onerous burden of debt which constricted the Empire, in return for Abdul Hamid's support.²¹ After over a year of negotiations, the Ottomans failed to proceed with the venture and concluded a deal with the so-called Rouvier group for the consolidation of the debt.²²

While Germany may have had neither the inclination nor the capability to carry off a political scheme in Palestine, the same was not to be the case with Great Britain.²³ The outbreak of a new wave of Jewish pogroms in Russia at the turn of the century brought with it a multitude of refugees to England. These poor Russian and Romanian Jews were looked upon as a threat to the British standard of living. For some time laws had been proposed to block their entry into England. The unrest stemmed principally from a desire to stem the flood of cheap labor. Yet the restrictions, if imposed, would have meant the first breach in England's traditional open door policy for the persecuted of the continent.²⁴ The government appointed a royal commission to investigate the matter and Herzl was able to have himself accepted as an expert witness. After a hearing his arguments, the commission proposed Uganda, a British territory without white settlers, as a suitable location for the Jewish homeland. At the Sixth Zionist Congress of 1903, Herzl accepted and endorsed the proposal of the British government for Jewish colonization of Uganda. The Uganda issue split the Zionist movement, temporarily.²⁵

In the meantime, several thousand Jews from eastern Europe had somehow made their way into Palestine and had begun competing with the indigenous Arab population for land and labor.²⁶ This is not to say that there was no attempt at compromise and accommodation between the Jews of the second Aliyah and the Palestinian Arabs, since it became clear to the Palestinians that they had to choose between two courses of action. They could either attempt to reach an accommodation with the Zionists, who in return for certain concessions, would place clearly defined limits on their territorial and immigration ambitions, or they would be obliged to fight the Zionists tooth and nail. In 1914, Rashid Rida, one of the foremost Muslim leaders of the time, stated the choice facing the Palestinian Arabs in these words:

"It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs - the local population - to do one of two things. Either they must reach an argument with leaders of the Zionists to settle the differences between the interests of both parties ... or they must gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first by forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed gangs which oppose them by force. Some say this is the first thing to be done because cauterization is the only way - and cauterization is the only remedy, as it's said ..."²⁷

This concern on the part of the Arabs over the increasing rate of Jewish migration, and their uncertainty as to what, in fact, were the Jews' ultimate goals, led to the call from the Arabs for a meeting to be held in Brumanna, Lebanon, with Zionist leaders. The agenda read, in part: "The Zionists should explain, as far as possible by producing

documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism, and of the colonization of Palestine connected therewith." This meeting, however, was never held; the First World War had broken out.

While the war in 1914 ended all hope that settlement in Africa could be effected, it opened entirely new possibilities with regard to Palestine. Consequently, the split within the Zionist movement was healed and the movement regained a united leadership. With the Ottoman Empire opposed by the Allied powers, Zionist association with the expected victors offered the most realistic avenue to the acquisition of Palestine.²⁹

WARTIME POLITICAL MANEUVERING

Towards the end of the War, Palestine emerged on the scene of global politics when the British army seized it from the Ottoman Turks. Its significance lay not simply in its geographic location, but in the fact that it was part of the process of dissolution of a once essential international actor. Since Turkey aligned herself on the side of Germany, Britain could no longer support the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Britain's next best option was to obtain a major part of the Ottoman Empire for herself. In addition, France also advanced claims for a significant portion of the Empire.³⁰ While these traditional systemic actors were maneuvering for position in the Middle East, what was to become one of the two major contemporary systemic actors in the Middle East arena, began to assert itself. Russia saw the opportunity to obtain control of the Bosphorous Straits and the Dardanelles, as well as the feasibility of making territorial gains in Anatolia.³¹

The Arabs, for their part, dreamed not only of liberation from four centuries of Turkish rule, but of real independence from foreign influence. The Zionists saw the end of the war and the shifting distribution of global political and military power as their opportunity to realize their dream of re-establishing a home for the Jewish nation in the historic land of Palestine. The goals and aspirations of these two peoples had little influence upon the diplomatic maneuvering which occurred during this period. The two major western powers, Britain and France, secretly concluded with Russia the Sykes-Picot Agreement on 9 May 1916. This agreement provided for the division of the Ottoman Empire into seven parts - Turkey; one part each to be under the rule of Russian, British, and French "administration," in addition, there were to be two "zones of influence" apportioned between the French and the British. Finally, there was an internationally administered area which extended through the land of Palestine, from Jerusalem to the coast.³² Ironically, the most backward parts of the Arab world - what is now Saudi Arabia and Yemen - were to be permitted independent statehood, while the more advanced and mature were to come under "direct or indirect" foreign rule.

During the war, the British had made promises to both Jews and Arabs in order to get their assistance in defeating the Turks. To this end, the British Government allowed some Arab leaders, notably Emir Hussayn of Mecca, to believe that if they aided the British in the overthrow of the Ottoman colonial regime, then their aspirations of postwar

independence would be fulfilled.³³ To the Jews, on the other hand, the British had also given a promise - that of a homeland in Palestine that was to be redeemed from the Turks.³⁴

An agreement between Britain and Ibn Saud, ruler of the Nejd, resulted in the latter's passive assistance, but the principal Arab - British agreement was made with Emir Hussayn of Mecca, a powerful influence in the Arab world. This was the Hussayn - McMahon correspondence, a series of letters containing the pledge of the British government to support the independence of the Arabs. By the terms used, the ultimate status of Palestine remained vague.³⁵

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

The Balfour Declaration, along with the previously discussed Sykes-Picot Agreement, was one of the two key documents that have shaped the modern history of the Middle East.³⁶ This declaration came about as a result of the Sykes-Picot agreement, but, it is far more important. The letter was sent from Arthur Balfour, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Lord Rothschild on 2 November 1917. This declaration, while not the first, is, perhaps the most obvious example of the unilateral relationship which prevailed between the traditional European systemic actors of the time and the emerging regional protagonists; it is reprinted here in its entirety.³⁷

"Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

'His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours Sincerely,

Arthur Balfour."

There has been much speculation as to why Balfour issued this declaration of support when and how he did. Although he is remembered as an early benefactor by many modern Zionists, it should be remembered that it was hardly love for the Jews which inspired this charity far from home. In the latter portions of the 19th century, as mentioned above, Britain had been flooded with Eastern European Jewish refugees. There were riots and demonstrations against them in the streets of London. In addition, an Aliens Act was passed which limited Jewish immigration. Lord Balfour himself defended the act, declaring,

"A state of things could easily be imagined in which it would not be to the advantage of the civilization of the country that there should be an immense body of persons, who however patriotic, able and industrious, however much they threw themselves into the national life, still, by their own action, remained a people apart, and not merely held a religion differing from the vast majority of their fellow countrymen, but only inter-married among themselves."³⁸

In addition to providing a convenient location to which to relegate the massive influx of Jews to Great Britain, the declaration had 2 other major goals. First there was a strategic concept, held by some British statesmen that if the Jews were restored to statehood in Palestine, they would be an ideal people to guard the British bastion of defense on the Palestinian land - bridge between the Nile and the Near East. Secondly, there was an important propaganda profit to be gained. In the difficult days of 1916, 1917, if the British could get the moral support of Jews, especially in America, then this support might provide a means of winning America over to the cause of the allied nations, thereby producing an obvious ancillary advantage.

At the time of its promulgation, many Arab leaders looked upon this Declaration with favor. The weak and inexperienced Arab National Movement looked to the Zionists for sympathy and assistance. The Mufti of Jerusalem appeared openly friendly,³⁹ and when Hussayn was informed of the Balfour Declaration, he responded with "... an expression of good will towards a kindred Semitic race."⁴⁰ Later, on 1 January 1919, Weizmann and Hussayn's son, Faisal, representing the Arab cause,

signed a "Treaty of Friendship" agreement providing for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Interestingly, Feisal made a remarkable statement at that time, especially in view of the emerging nationalism of Jews and Arabs. "The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles, we are absolutely as one."⁴¹ Further, in March of that year, Feisal, again acting officially, this time as leader of the Hejazi delegation to Paris, stated, in a letter to Justice Felix Frankfurter, "We Arabs look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement . . . We will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home."⁴²

DEVELOPING PATTERNS OF MUTUAL EXPLOITATION

A later section of this paper will deal with the present day sub-systemic dominance of the relationship of the Middle East to the International system. Even at this early stage in the internationalization of the Palestine problem, conflicting interests and plans for mutual exploitation may be seen emerging:

"We therefore, say that while the creation of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine is our final ideal . . . the way to achieve it lies through a series of intermediary stages. And one of those intermediary stages, which I hope is going to come about as the result of the war, is that the fair country of Palestine will be protected by such a mighty and just power as Great Britain. Under the wing of this power, Jews will be able to develop and to set up the administrative machinery which . . . would enable us to carry out the Zionist scheme."⁴³

The above is an excerpt from a speech delivered by Weizmann to the English Zionist Union in 1917, and demonstrates that although the manipulation of the traditional nineteenth century colonial powers may have played a large role in creating a situation within the region which made conflict inevitable, still the prospective participants within the region were loathe to see these extra regional powers leave the area and then to their own devices. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the United States and the Soviet Union as the major bloc actors in the contemporary international system are being asked by the regional actors for much the same sort of protection as Weizmann described.

That the interest in great power of participation in the area was reciprocal is evidenced by this memorandum of Lord Balfour to the British cabinet:

"Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind ... The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant* and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the "independent nation" of Palestine than in that of the "independent nation" of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitant of the country ... The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism, and Zionism be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudice of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land ... In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy, which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violage. "44

* Covenant of the League of Nations

Thus, it can be seen that the problem of mutual non-recognition described in the preceding chapter applied not only to the regional protagonists but to the systemic actors as well. How else to explain the statement that "Zionism ... is ... of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land."

At war's end, the British were faced with the resolution of their conflicting promises and agreements. The peace settlement for the Arab areas came with the San Remo Conference of April 1920 - however, this agreement was unable to foster true peace in the area. Since the Allied pledges regarding Arab independence were not fulfilled after the war, most Arab leaders regarded the Faisal-Weizmann agreement as invalid. The Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine had begun, and was destined to continue, at varying levels of intensity, until now.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANDATE

If the Zionists did not obtain their desire for the early creation of Herzl's "Judenstaat," they were not entirely frustrated either. Palestine was mandated to Britain by the League of Nations, with the provisions of the Balfour Declaration written into the Mandate. In accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement, the predominately Arab area of the toppled Turkish Empire was duly divided between France and Britain, and the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at San Remo on 25 April 1920 assigned the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain.⁴⁶ This was a class "A" mandate, which, as outlined in the Covenant, meant

that the tutelage of Britain was to be temporary, and was to lead to ultimate independence of Palestine.⁴⁷ The principle of self-determination espoused by Wilson was thus rejected. There were no American delegates present at the Conference, however, the American Ambassador to Italy, Robert Underwood Johnson, did come to San Remo. It appears that he was not properly briefed on the issues and did not receive full instructions from Washington.⁴⁸ Lenczowski quotes moreover thus, "For two days the representative of the United States sat in a hotel garden reading the newspapers while the British and French settled the most important matters affecting the Middle East."⁴⁹

The "Principle Allied Powers" had, therefore, not only selected Great Britain as the Mandatory for Palestine, but had also in Articles 2 and 6 of the Mandate, repeated the language of the Balfour Declaration in outlining the responsibilities of the new Mandatory - to place Palestine "under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home."⁵⁰ The terms of the mandate received the approval of the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, although it was not formalized until an agreement was reached between Great Britain and the League of Nations on 23 September, 1922.⁵¹

The decisions of the San Remo Conference and the resultant Mandate were not carried out without considerable bloodshed. There was an uprising by Muslims and Christian Arabs in Palestine, armed against the Jews, who were already demanding that Palestine should be called

Eretz Israel with the Jewish flag as its national emblem. Although the Palestinian Arabs had not been enthusiastic supporters of the Arab Revolt, they were now united in their fear and dislike of Zionism.⁵²

It is evident, therefore, that the question of Palestine had become internationalized, and incorporated in the new world order envisioned by the League of Nations. This vision included the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. (Although the United States did not join the League, it supported the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine by a joint resolution of Congress in 1922.)⁵³ The powers responsible for the creation of the mandate, and the appropriation of influence within the Middle East subsystem were much more precise in delimiting each other's sphere of influence within the subsystem than they were in dealing with the primordial affinities and rivalries in the area; further the desires of the emerging political movement within the subsystem, with the exception of Zionism, which was closely coupled with the political subsystem of the essential national actors, were hardly considered at all.

Important changes in the international system precipitated by the increasing rigidity of the system of alignment, since approximately 1870, and the subsequent violation of the rule that "defeated or constrained essential national actors . . . re-enter the system as acceptable role partners . . ." were an important factor in the outbreak of the First World War.⁵⁴ Thus, there was a greater need for integrating roles other than the "balancing" role specified in Kaplan's essential rules of

the "Balance of power" system. To meet this need the Hague Tribunal and the League of Nations implemented a new integrative role more consistent with the loose bipolar system, signaling a dangerous instability in the "balance of power" system.⁵⁵

Although Kaplan's view is that the peace settlements after the First World War were not completely inconsistent with the essential rules of the system, they may have encouraged those national tendencies that were to become inconsistent with them. "When the international and national sets of essential rules were no longer in equilibrium, one set had to give."⁵⁶

The disintegrative process of the "balance of power" international system had begun. The transformance of the international system was not abrupt, however, and one cannot claim that the transformation into a bipolar bloc system was complete until after the Second World War. The next chapter will deal with a challenge to the regulatory orientation of the developing system, from systemic dominance to a system of sub-systemic challenge.

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IV. SUB-SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A DISINTEGRATING "BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM

Safran¹ delineates certain relatively well defined phases through which the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved. The first stage, which was described in the preceding chapter, lasted until approximately 1933. During that time, Britain, as Mandatory power in Palestine, wielded great influence in the Arab world and had nearly full discretion to decide the Palestine issue on its own merits, as it conceived them, and in keeping with its broader national interests. Safran's second phase begins a few years later, when the growing strength of Arab and Jewish nationalisms imposed severe restrictions on Britain's discretionary power and transformed the process from one of adjudication into an issue of political management of conflicting interests. The division of phases of the conflict fits well with the supposition of the paper that as the "balance of power" international system continued the deterioration begun by the First World War, the subsystemic actors began to challenge the systemic dominance of the essential national actors.

At this point, the author feels it important to restate the difference between his use of the terms system or subsystem dominance and that used by Kaplan. For Kaplan:

"The 'balance of power' international system is a subsystem dominant system in which the complementary actions of several of the essential subsystems serve to maintain the essential rules of the system."²

These essential subsystems are the great national powers. As used in this paper, however, the terms system dominance or subsystem dominance refer to the coercive relationships between the essential subsystems (systemic actors) and the non-essential subsystems (subsystemic or regional actors). To the extent that the behavior of the regional actors is determined by either direct channels of communication from the systemic actors to them, or by the systems of interaction between the systemic actors, then the system is systemically dominated. Britain's relationship with the subsystemic actors within its mandated territory was virtually totally system dominant during the first years of the mandate and, thus, this system of relationships approximated a political subsystem, with Britain acting as "arbiter ... available to keep jurisdictional disputes within ... given bounds."³ This chapter will deal with the dissolution of that international quasi-political subsystem as the regional actors develop their growing nationalisms.

THE ARAB REBELLION

By 1935, the legal-not to mention illegal-Jewish immigration to Palestine had reached the record figure of 61,844 per year. Land sales were increasing: in 1933 there had been 673 of them, in 1934, 1,178. More and more peasants were losing their livelihood; yet, as early as 1931, it had been estimated that 30,000 peasant families, or 22 per cent of the rural population were landless.⁴ Their average per capita income was seven pounds per year, compared to 34 pounds for the Jewish farmers who replaced them. And the peasant family's average

indebtedness - 25 to 30 pounds - was about the same as its average earnings.⁵

It was in this fertile soil that the seeds of the Arab rebellion took root. On 12 November, 1935, Shaikh Iszedin Qassem presided over a secret meeting in the slum quarter of Haifa. Qassem had been a "marriage steward" for the Haifa Muslim court, consequently he was able to move easily among the inhabitants of the countryside. He knew both peasants and workers and continually preached about the dangers of Zionism. Over the years, he had gathered a band of about 800 followers. They pledged to give their lives for Palestine; they supplied their own arms and contributed what else they could to the cause. Their training was to be done by stealth, at night.⁶

After the meeting at Haifa, Qassem and a group of his closest followers made their way to the hills of Janin. They spent their days in caves, praying and reciting the Quaran. At night they attacked Jews and the British. Shortly after they began their raids, however, the authorities sent out a mixed force of British and Arab troops to track them down. Qassem and his followers were forced to premature battle. Called upon to surrender, he shouted, "Never, this is a jihad for God and country." He called upon his followers to "die as martyrs." After a battle lasting several hours, Qassem was killed, along with several companions, the rest were captured.⁷

This brief and militarily futile rebellion stirred up the Palestinian masses. Qassem became for them a symbol and a rallying point,

somewhat as Joseph Trumpeldor had been for the Jews in 1920. He was the archetypal fedayi - "one who sacrifices himself" - and was the precursor of the contemporary Palestinian movement.

By 1936, serious confrontations between Arab and Jew were becoming common. The British forces were being increasingly pressured by both sides. The rapid Jewish immigration continued and contributed to an Arab demand for immediate self-government and a cessation of immigration. By the end of April, a general Arab strike spread throughout the land and precipitated violence between Arabs and Jews as well as against the British presence.⁸ The Mufti, who had called for the strike, was as severe with Arabs who were selling lands, and in other ways accommodating Jewish immigration, as he was with the Jews themselves. The British, too, were objects of the Arab revolt: Britons were killed; the Haifa pipeline sabotaged; and railways and roads were mined.⁹

THE PEEL COMMISSION

In May, Britain sought to quell these disturbances by sending Earl Peel as head of yet another commission of inquiry. But an impasse developed: The Peel Commission would not leave England until the Arab's general strike ended, but the Arab High Committee would not end the strike until Jewish immigration was suspended, and the British refused to cancel the immigration schedules. Palestine had grown important to the British Empire because of the air routes to Asia and Africa, sea lanes through Suez and the Mediterranean, and oil deliveries from

Iraq. The government claimed that the security of these interests were dependent upon the success of Zionism in Palestine. British difficulties and embarrassment mounted. Sentiment and pronouncements in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and India sided with the Arabs, while Poland and the United States pressed England to favor the Zionists.¹⁰

In October, the Arab Higher Committee agreed to call off the strike, without a concurrent suspension of immigration, largely due to the pleas of the Kings of Iraq and Saudi Arabia - both of whom were under considerable British pressure - and the Peel Commission arrived in November. The reader should note that the British were still able as an extra regional actor to influence a regional actor or to exert intra-regional pressure to achieve the goals of the extra regional actor.

The Commission published its report in July, 1937, and stated that the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the Jewish National Home were the underlying causes of the disturbances. It stated that Arab and Jewish interests could not be reconciled under the Mandate and suggested the partition of Palestine.¹¹ Both Arabs and Jews attacked the report, thus making its implementation at that time impossible. In November, 1938, Britain rejected the recommendations of the Peel Commission, because the commission was unable to recommend "boundaries for the proposed areas which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States."¹²

PROTOTYPE OF CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN NEGOTIATIONS

The British position paper of 1938, went on to state:

"... It is clear that the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews, and His Majesty's Government are prepared in the first instance to make a determined effort to promote such an understanding. With this end in view, they propose immediately to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of the neighboring States on the one hand, and of the Jewish Agency on the other, to confer with them as soon as possible in London regarding future policy, including the question of immigration to Palestine. As regards the representation of the Palestinian Arabs, His Majesty's Government must reserve the right to refuse to receive those leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence."¹³

Note the similarity between this call for discussions and the present efforts of the major extra-regional powers to get the opposing regional factions to meet together with them at Geneva. Note, too, the reservation expressed concerning the representation of the Palestinian Arabs, a reservation similar to the modern Israeli rejection of direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The meeting eventually took place and lasted a month. It was marked by reciprocal obstructionism and demonstrated the immensity of difference of opinion between the two sides. Representatives of the Arab states did meet with Weizmann, but the Palestinians did not. Whereas, in 1914, the opposing sides would have been ready, had global war not prevented it, to meet with the enemy over the negotiating

table, the intervening 25 years had seen the dimensions of the struggle grow to such proportions that to have done so now would have conferred a legitimacy on the whole Zionist enterprise almost as unthinkable as "recognizing" Israel was to be for the generation to come.¹⁴

In a prefiguration of "indirect negotiations," of "proximity talks," of jet-age "shuttle-diplomacy" - and all the other procedural ingenuities that peace makers of the future would devise, the conference took the form of separate discussions between the British, the Arabs, then the British and the Jews. When the inevitable impasse was reached, Britain issued a unilateral position paper, known as the MacDonald White Paper of 17 May 1939 (so-called after Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary). The paper declared that since the earlier partition plan had been found to be impractical, a new method of solving the Palestine problem, consistent with Britain's obligations to both Arabs and Jews, would be attempted. The Balfour Declaration, the document stated, had not envisaged the conversion of all of Palestine into a Jewish State, but merely the establishment in that country of a "Jewish National Home," which meant the development of the existing Jewish community into a center for Jewish people. Since the Jewish population of Palestine had increased to about 450,000, approaching one third of the population, the government considered that it had carried out its obligation in this respect.¹⁵ Consequently the government announced that 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted over the next five years, but that no

more would be admitted after that without the prior approval of the Arabs; that land sales should be strictly regulated; and that self governing institutions should be established with a view to the independence of the Palestinian state within ten years. ¹⁶

REGIONAL REACTION

The Arab Higher Committee rejected this solution, and demanded independence rather than a ten year delay. Fisher attributes this rejection by the Arabs to their fear-based upon how quickly previous statements favorable to the Arab cause (the Churchill and Passfield documents, for example) were disowned by the British government, that Jewish pressure upon the government could substantially alter, if not nullify the projected outcome. Nonetheless, a substantial portion of Palestinian Arabs felt that they were at last receiving fair treatment and supported the White Paper.

The Zionist responded instantly and violently. In Palestine, the broadcasting station which was to proclaim the recommendations of the White paper, could not do so at the appointed hour because its studios were bombed and its transmission lines cut. The headquarters of the Department of Migration was set afire and government offices in Haifa and Tel Aviv were stormed by crowds intent on destroying any files pertaining to illegal Jewish immigration. ¹⁷ David Ben Gurion wrote that these demonstrations marked "the beginning of Jewish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government.

The Jews will not be intimidated into surrender, even if their blood will be shed."¹⁸

MOBILIZATION OF ZIONIST FORCES

In his book, Israel Without Zionists, Uri Avnery discusses the disputes between "practical" Zionism, as espoused by Ben Gurion and supported by Weizmann, and "political" Zionism, as advocated by Jabatinsky and the right wing faction. Avnery goes on to coin a new term to describe the accomplishments of Jabatinsky and his followers: "Gun Zionism!"¹⁹ The ideological roots of "Gun Zionism" extend to Herzl himself. It was inevitable, he said, that armed force would eventually come into its own as the principal instrument of a movement which in its earlier and less defined period, could only rely upon the protection of an imperial sponsor. The period of dependency upon an extra-regional sponsor was rapidly drawing to a close. The spirit of Jabatinsky, who founded the Jewish Legion during World War I and later led the underground Haganah army, was permeating the Yishuv.²⁰

When the Arab rebellion manifested itself with acts of violence, the Jews officially espoused a program of Havlagah or self-restraint. This concept was deeply rooted in Jewish ethics. The Jews felt that they should not respond to Arab terrorism with their own. It was felt that the Jewish claim to moral superiority was worth more than any transitory success over Arab terrorists which entailed a resort to similar modes of operation. Weizmann himself described the principle of

self-restraint as "one of the great moral acts of modern times," an act which had won the admiration of liberal opinion all over the world."²¹

Havlaga was a concept doomed to extinction. In one month, July, 1938 at least 100 Arabs died in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem - more Arabs dead than Jews killed in the whole of that year so far.²²

Schechtman²³ states that Jabatinsky was not certain as to the morality of terrorism. He once said: "I can't see much heroism and public good in shooting from the rear an Arab peasant on a donkey, carrying vegetables for sale in Tel Aviv."²³ Eventually, however, he came to accept and advocate a policy of wholesale retaliation. Moreover, he early recognized the difficulties involved in limiting retaliation to only the "bandits" involved in violent acts against the Jewish populace. He said: "... the choice is not between retaliating against the bandits or against the hostile population. The choice is between ... retaliating against the hostile population or not retaliating at all To the spilling of ha'dam hamutar the permitted blood, on which there is no prohibition and for which nobody has to pay, an end has been put in Palestine ... it was not only difficult to punish only the guilty ones, in most cases it was impossible."²⁴

Although the Jews responded effectively and with perhaps a vengeance to Arab attacks upon them, it was by publically espousing a policy of Havlaga that they were able to make their most important political/military power, demoralizing the population, and constraining such

leadership as was evident, allowed the Jewish leaders to mold the Yishuv into a formidable fighting force.

"Havlagah, however genuine in some, was purely expedient in others. It was designed to win British support for the establishment of a Jewish militia."²⁵

In 1936, the Mandatory administration authorized the formation of a 1,240 man Jewish supernumerary police. That same year, it informed the Zionist leaders that a special force of constables would be permitted to remain in being, with their weapons, provided that Haganah was disbanded and its illegal weapons confiscated. Eventually, as Arab violence grew, the confiscation was dropped, and in the following two years the force was expanded until, by 1939, it totalled 14,500 men, or approximately 5 per cent of the Yishuv.²⁶

In 1939, after the MacDonal White Paper, the Jewish community prepared to fight against the Mandate. British rules, no longer nurtured the Zionist cause, but held it back. The new era of "organized revolutionary rule" by the Jewish minority had arrived. The Jews recognized the need to get rid of the mandate and continue their nation building program. The systemic cataclysm of the Second World War, however, would slow down the rapidly advancing movement to do away with the Mandate. With the outbreak of the war the Yishuv rallied to the support of the Allied Powers and anti-British violence virtually came to an end. As Weizmann predicted this war furnished opportunities for the Zionist movement and its aim of an independent Jewish State in Palestine as

great as had been provided by the First World War. The war gave the idea of a Jewish state a final and decisive push. The tragedy that befell European Jews, called in Hebrew Hashoah, or the Holocaust, completely changed the psychological and political scene.²⁸ Zionism's "center of gravity" was transitioning from the Diaspora to the Yishuv.²⁹

WORLD WAR II

It is impossible to assess the full impact that a systemic upheaval of the magnitude of the Second World War had upon the unfolding conflict in the Middle East. As was mentioned above, the 1939 White Paper was met with at least partial rejection by the Arabs and outrage by the Jews. Just how far Britain was prepared to go to insure its implementation, and to what lengths the regional powers would attempt to frustrate it will never be known for the cataclysm of Global war intervened.

The Jews' efforts to obtain sanctuary for their millions in Central Europe had been dimly barren; only the tiny Dominican Republic had displayed any truly humanitarian concern for their plight by offering to accept 100,000 refugees, a huge sum in proportion to her size.³⁰

Britain, courting Arab assistance, refused to abrogate the 1939 White Paper. The official Zionist attitude was again expressed by Ben Gurion when he said, "We shall fight with Great Britain in this war as if there was no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there was no war."³² This the Jews did - as much as was permitted them. Their constant pleas for the formation of a Jewish Army within the British

Forces was repeatedly refused until nearly the end of the war.³² The Yishuv, nonetheless, achieved an extremely high production rate for war materials and the Mossad (Committee for Illegal Immigration) was forced to terminate its European activities by which thousands of immigrants had been smuggled to Palestine, and to concentrate on other areas until the war was over.³³

Palestine itself was relatively quiet during the war, although to anyone not totally concerned with the war against Germany, the coming eruption was easy to predict. The Arab rebellion died down and Jewish immigration nearly stopped due to the inability of Jews to escape Nazi occupied Europe. Although the Zionists cooperated strongly with Britain at the early stages of the war, the failure, due primarily to British military opposition of the Zionists to form a Jewish Army to fight Nazism, turned the Zionists increasingly against Britain as the war progressed. A series of attacks by two extremist groups, the Stern Gang and the Irgun, culminated in the assassination of Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State in Cairo. The military capabilities of the Palestinian Jews greatly improved during the war. Apart from the 27,000 Jews who received training in the British forces, the Jewish munitions industry developed rapidly and the unofficial Zionist forces ended the war with an ample stockpile of light arms.³⁴

The Arabs, also, were not totally inactive. Their assistance to the Allies was meager at first, but increased as the war continued and

it appeared that the Allies would win. In Egypt, for example, diplomatic relations were broken with Germany when World War II began, and with Italy when Italy entered the war in the summer of 1940. Yet war was not declared. The country became a main staging area for the British Eight Army as the western desert became a major theater of operations, and in the exigencies of the situation, such freedom of action as was possessed by Egypt was quickly subordinated to the demands of the British military. Egyptian reticence or sympathy for the Axis, widely shared in the Arab world, was overcome by a coup de main in which the British forces surrounded the palace of King Farouk in February 1941 and threatened to depose the king unless he named a prime minister of their choosing.³⁵

It may be said that the end of World War II marked a real beginning of independence and self-assertion in the Arab countries. With the departure of the Allied Forces and the formal nationalization of the military forces which had been created in the mandate states, National government had more real power, but also accepted more responsibility than ever before.

During the war, international Zionism shifted its main effort from Britain to the United States, where it was supported by both Major political parties. This shift was of great significance, because, henceforth, United States concern with Palestine was to be the principal factor shaping its Middle East policies. A related and equally important

development was the challenge mounted against Weizmann by Ben Gurion against the former's unquestionable leadership of World Zionism. Although Weizmann remained the symbol of the World Zionist Movement, it was Ben Gurion who assumed a position of unquestioned leadership in Palestine. With his accession to power in the words of Peter Mansfield, "... the last remote hope of a peaceful outcome in Palestine disappeared."³⁶

THE DEVOLUTION OF BRITISH POWER IN PALESTINE

Two weeks after the end of the war, the Zionists demanded from Churchill's coalition government that Palestine be proclaimed "undiminished and undivided," as a Jewish state. The government deferred any such proclamation until a general peace conference was convened. Shortly thereafter, Churchill's government was defeated at the polls and the Labor Party assumed power. The new government also refused to act on the demands, and called, instead for yet another Commission of Inquiry to Palestine.

Zionist activism aimed at the imminent establishment of the Jewish state turned towards acts of violence. Perhaps the high point of their campaign against the British occurred in July, 1946 with the attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, an attack in which 88 people, Britons, Arabs and Jews were killed.³⁷ The response in Britain to this and other acts of violence against British presence in Palestine took two forms; the first response was anger, an anger which became generalized

to include even Jews living in England who were viewed as supporters of the terrorist groups which attacked British military forces. There were anti-Jewish protests which occasionally became violent, and several instances of the desecration of synagogues.³⁸ The second response was a call for Britain to extricate itself from the quagmire that its mandate had become. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, urged that Britain " . . . lay our Mandate at the feet of the United Nations Organization and thereafter evacuate the country with which we have no connection or tradition and where we have no sovereignty as in India and no treaty as in Egypt . . ."³⁹ These sentiments were echoed by Field Marshall Montgomery, who concluded, "if we were not prepared to maintain law and order in Palestine it would be better to get out."⁴⁰

Palestine had become an insufferable problem for Britain. Its internationalization by the Great Powers, through the machinery of the League of Nations and the specific instrument of the British Mandate had only exacerbated the incipient conflict between two peoples with claims to the same land. Having repeatedly failed to find a satisfactory solution to the Palestine dilemma, and facing mounting domestic opposition to its foreign policy, Britain laid the problem before the successor of the League of Nations, the fledgling United Nations Organization.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

The United Nations was born of the war, and was a manifestation of the changes taking place in the international system. Kaplan credits

informational inputs concerning the increased destructiveness of war, and the failure of international actors to internalize the norms of the system and to limit their goals of expansion as major factors leading to the establishment of universal actors, such as the United Nations.⁴¹

One of the first major challenges to the fledgling organization was the problem of Palestine, a problem which the British had despaired of solving unilaterally.

On 2 April 1947, the British representative at the United Nations, Sir Alexander Cadogan requested that the issue of Palestine be addressed at that year's session of the General Assembly. On 29 November, the Assembly, by two-thirds vote adopted a resolution on the "Plan of Partition with Economic Union of Palestine."⁴² The vote on the resolution was thirty-three in the affirmative, thirteen in the negative with ten abstentions.⁴³ The major provisions of the plan are as follows:

- (1) The Mandate was terminated
- (2) The Arab State, the Jewish State, and the international regime for Jerusalem were to come into being two months after the departure of the British troops, which was scheduled for 1 August 1948.
- (3) The boundaries of the three territories were defined.
- (4) Economic union was to be achieved through a Joint Economic Board
- (5) A United Nations Palestine Commission of five member nations was established to implement the General Assembly resolutions.

(6) The Security Council was called upon to assist in the implementation of the plan.

(7) No discrimination was to be made between the inhabitants on the basis of race, religion, language, or sex.

The "solution" therefore, was a partition similar to that proposed by the Royal Commission in 1937: a partition into a Jewish State, an Arab State, and an internationally administered Jerusalem.

Primary responsibility for assuring the implementation of the resolution was placed upon the Palestine Commission. The actual implementation, however, depended upon the policies of the permanent members of the Security Council, since enforcement of United Nations policies was the responsibility of that organization. The commission invited the Higher Arab Committee, Britain, as Mandatory power, and the Jewish Agency to send representatives to "be available to the commission."⁴⁴ Although both Britain and the Jewish Agency accepted the invitation, the Arab Higher Committee refused and issued the following statement on 6 February 1948:⁴⁵

"The Arabs of Palestine will never recognize the validity of the extorted partition recommendations or the authority of the United Nations to make them ...

The Arabs of Palestine consider that any attempt by Jews or any Power or group of Powers to establish a Jewish state in Arab territory is an act of aggression which will be resisted in self-defense by force."

In Palestine the situation continued to deteriorate. The extent of the violence from the passage of the Partition Resolution until 1 February

1948 was revealed in the casualty figures, which totalled 2,778, of whom 869 were killed. The Arabs suffered 1,462 casualties; the Jews, 1,106; and the British, 181.⁴⁶ On 10 April, 1948, the Palestine Commission reported to the General Assembly that "... as a result of Arab armed opposition to the resolution of the General Assembly, counter or preventive measures taken by the organized Jewish community, and the continued activity of Jewish extremist elements, Palestine is now a battlefield."⁴⁷ Arab-Israeli violence had increased to a point described by one author as "an experiment in anarchy."⁴⁸ The commission was forced to admit that it had now become impossible to implement the Partition Resolution.⁴⁹

THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The British had announced that they were leaving Palestine on 15 May, 1948, but, in fact, they left the day before: at nine o'clock on the morning of 14 May, 1948, Sir Alan Cunningham, last British High Commissioner, left Palestine. At four o'clock that afternoon, in the Tel Aviv Museum of Modern Art, David Ben Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the sovereign Jewish State, to be called Israel.⁵⁰ On the same day, the representatives of the Jewish Agency informed the United Nations that a Jewish State had been proclaimed. In its Proclamation of Independence, Israel announced that it was willing "to cooperate with the organs and representatives of the Resolution of the Assembly of 29 November 1947, and will take steps to bring about

the Economic Union over the whole of Palestine."⁵¹ The United States, which had earlier proposed a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, nevertheless granted immediate de facto recognition of the Provisional Government of the state of Israel.⁵² The Soviet Union followed suit, and three days later became the third country to recognize Israel. In the words of Theodore Draper, "If the existence of the State of Israel was the original sin, the Soviets were as implicated in it as anyone else."⁵³ The United Nations General Assembly, having failed to enforce its Partition Resolution, terminated the Palestine Commission and appointed a mediator to promote the peaceful settlement of the situation in Palestine.

THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

On 15 May, 1948, after the Mandatory force had withdrawn from Palestine, the Arab states attacked the newly proclaimed State of Israel. In a telegram to the United Nations Secretary General, the Arab States informed him that they were compelled to intervene in Palestine because the disturbances there constituted a serious and direct threat to peace and security within the territories of the Arab states, and "in order to restore peace and establish law in Palestine."⁵⁴

This first Arab-Israeli dispute, is remarkable in that it exemplifies the deep seated problem of mutual non-recognition described in an earlier chapter concerning the perceptual aspect of the conflict. As Safran

states:⁵⁵

"... Transjordan aside, the leaders, soldiers, politicians, writers, journalists, not to speak of the common people of the Arab countries had had no contact with the Jewish community in Palestine and therefore, had but a faint idea of its composition, organization, achievement, guiding ideals, aspirations and strength. The Arab government had been drawn into the diplomatic arena of the Jewish-Arab conflict only a short time before and did not expect to become directly involved in it militarily. In any case, they were so certain of their superior strength that they did not think it worthwhile to assemble more than perfunctory intelligence at the very last moment before the opening of hostilities. The Arabs' almost total lack of non-belligerent contact with the enemy's people and country, and the Israelis' only slightly less sweeping lack of control with the Arab states, was to continue after the war and to provide what is probably a unique example of nations at war that had never known one another in peaceful commerce. This mutual ignorance accounts for much of the extreme fluctuation in the sensitivities and mutual assessments of intentions that has been characteristic of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict."

The considerable disruption of mandated Palestine which the Palestinian Arabs were able to inflict despite their primitive equipment, lack of training, and loose organization had convinced the Arab governments that a small regular force could succeed in destroying Israel. There was also a question of Arab intentions. Of course the Arab states would, if presented with the option, have destroyed the new Jewish state. Indeed, there were numerous public statements to the effect that they would do so. Musa Alami, a distinguished Palestinian leader visited the Arab capitals shortly before the Israeli Declaration of Independence

in order to assess just what sort of help the Palestinians could expect from their Arab brethren. He discovered that the Arab leadership was no better equipped to cope with the growing "Zionist peril," than the Palestinian leadership had been when it was alone in the field.⁵⁶ One author gives this account of the responses he received:

"I am happy to tell you," the Syrian President assured him, "that our Army and its equipment are of the highest order and well able to deal with a few Jews, and I can tell you in confidence that we even have an atomic bomb;" and seeing Musa's expression of incredulity, he went on, "yes, it was made locally; we fortunately found a very clever fellow, a tinsmith . . ." Elsewhere he found equal complacency, and ignorance which was little less crass. In Iraq, he was told by the Prime Minister that all that was needed was "a few brooms" to drive the Jews into the sea; by confidants of Ibn Saud in Cairo, that "once we get the green light from the British we can easily throw out the Jews . . ."⁵⁷

There appears to be a relatively prevalent misconception amongst casual commentators on the conflict, that the Israelis were severely outnumbered by the Arabs. Images of 650,000 Israelis fending off some 40 million Arabs are often conjured up. In fact the military advantage rested with the Israelis as the Arab troops were dispatched to Palestine on 15 May, 1948. The Zionist forces had, by the beginning of the war had far more men and women mobilized than the Arab countries, and they maintained and increased this disparity in the course of hostilities.⁵⁸ The May Zionist forces included some 30,000 fully mobilized regular troops, at least 32,000 second-line troops, which could be attached to the regulars as need arose, some 15,000 Jewish settlement

police, a home guard of 32,000-plus the forces of the Irgun and Stern Gang. The Arab Liberation Army, on the other hand, mustered 3,830 volunteers-at least 1,000 of them Palestinians. This group began a gradual infiltration into Palestine in January 1948. The forces which the five Arab states - Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon - dispatched numbered some 15,000 men; whose heaviest armor consisted of 22 light tanks.⁵⁹

It is perhaps indicative of the unrealistic assessment which the Arabs had made of the forces required to defeat the Jews and of their own military potential, that the initial Arab plan was not to field the total of even this modest force. Instead, they initially entrusted the intervention to Transjordan's 6,000 strong Arab Legion alone. King Abdullah, however whose forces had served under the Mandatory administration in Palestine, knew better than this. He consequently overtly accepted the mandate of his Arab League partners, while covertly arranging with the Jews that the Arab Legion would seek to take over only those parts of Palestine allocated to the Arabs by the partition plan.⁶⁰ This plan was nullified when Egypt, fearing that Abdullah's ambitions were to take over the whole of Palestine, dispatched its own forces into Palestine, and induced the other Arab government to follow suit and adopt a common plan of action aimed at destroying Israel, or, as a fall back position, limiting it to the narrowest confines.⁶¹ Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League promised that it would be "... a war of

extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades."⁶² The Arabs scored some initial successes, and the Egyptians linked up with the Arab Legion near Bethlehem, but the Israelis, fighting desperately, launched a violent counteroffensive which ended in an Arab collapse.⁶³ After twenty-seven days of open fighting, a cease fire was arranged by Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator sent to restore peace to Palestine.

Fighting broke out again on 8 July, but the Arab armies were disorganized and had no common plan of action. The Israeli forces used the ten days of renewed fighting to expand their area of occupation. As one writer points out, the Arabs had not accepted partition, so they lost much of the territory which would have been the Arab state in Palestine. After the first cease fire, they did not accept Bernadotte's plan to give them the Negev, so they lost it.⁶⁴

Evidence of continuing Arab disunity may be seen in the events of September, when during the cease fire, an "Arab Government of all Palestine" was proclaimed. This organization was recognized by all the Arab government except Transjordan, which organized its own "National Congress." This widening rift between Kings Abdullah and Farouk, enabled the Israelis to concentrate their strength against the Egyptian forces and increase their territory to the south. Another cease fire was proclaimed on 22 October in the south, but on the same day fighting broke out in Lebanon to the north. On 22 December, the Israelis' penetrated Egyptian territory.⁶⁵

Britain announced that it would intervene in accordance with its treaty of 1936 with Egypt unless Israel withdrew her forces from Egyptian territory and stability was regained in Egypt. The Egyptian government, seeking to avoid a return of British forces to its soil notified the United Nations that it was prepared to discuss peace. The resulting armistice was signed in February 1949 by Israel and Egypt, and later by all other parties except Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen. Open war was terminated, but true peace was still a distant and not very promising prospect. ⁶⁶

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The end of the Second World War brought with it the emergence of a new type of international system. The traditional systemic actors in the "balance of power" system gave way to two powerful blocs, the leaders of which were the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. The de facto existence of these blocs was given de jure recognition with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 by the western powers, and with the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955 by the Soviet leadership.

Unlike the "balance of power" system in which only actors of the subclass national actor were considered as "essential," the emerging bipolar system included supra-national actors as well. Further the class of supranational actors is divided into two-subclasses: bloc actors, of which NATO and the Communist bloc are examples; and "universal actors," such as the United Nations. ⁶⁷ Of the bloc actors, the Communist

bloc displayed hierarchical organizational features, while the Western Bloc was non hierarchically organized.⁶⁸ Because the functional integration within a hierarchically organized bloc is at a high level, it becomes difficult for non-leading members to withdraw. As a result, new members are usually attracted as the result of military absorption or political ascendance of a native political party which already has "associate" membership in the bloc through an international party organization. Furthermore, the pressure which the hierarchically organized bloc system exerts upon the non-hierarchically organized bloc is likely to force the non hierarchically organized bloc to integrate its bloc activities more closely and to extend those activities to other functional areas.⁶⁹

As for the leading national actors within each bloc, the United States frustrated British attempts, after the Second World War, to draw it into a responsible position in Middle Eastern politics.⁷⁰ This position changed, however, as a result of Soviet incursions into the area: territorial demands upon Turkey in 1945, and the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran in 1946, as well as its influence in the Greek civil war of 1946. The major interest of the United States in the Middle East thus became its desire to keep the Soviet Union out of the region as part of its overall policy of containment. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union was in a position to capitalize upon the three principal trends in contemporary Arab nationalism: neutralism, anti-Zionism, and radicalism.⁷¹

Although the Soviet Union had acted in support of the creation of the State of Israel, it now was able to exploit the regional tensions which developed as a result of the implementation of a Western oriented state, identified with the colonialist powers, in the midst of hostile Arab states, which were themselves in the process of emerging as independent national entities. As Bernard Lewis points out, "Russian colonialism was in areas remote from Arab lands, and in forms unfamiliar to the Arab peoples, who only knew the maritime, liberal, commercial empires of the West."⁷² Consequently, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union was able to pursue a policy aimed at achieving hegemony in the Middle East, without being categorized as a colonialist power.

If the new "superpowers" or leading national bloc actors, were only first discovering their position and their relative power in the international system, so, too, was the subsystemic challenge to that system diffuse and unstructured. Amongst the regional actors, the conduct of the Jew/Israelis was perhaps the most coherent. Nevertheless, the political leadership which announced the creation of the Jewish State did not possess the means to coerce its followers into disciplined action. In addition to the Haganah, there were irregulars, radical military organizations such as the Irgun. This lack of centralized authority is evident in the following statement of Chaim Weizmann to the U.N. Committee on Palestine in 1947:

"In all humbleness, "Thou shalt not kill" has been ingrained in us since Mount Sinai. It was inconceivable ten years ago that Jews should break this commandment. Unfortunately, they are breaking it today, and nobody deplures it more than the vast majority of Jews. I hang my head in shame when I have to speak of this fact before you."⁷³

As for the Arabs, despite pan-Arab rhetoric, the task of resisting the formation of the state of Israel lay primarily with those directly affected, namely the Palestinian Arabs. The forces of Arab states outside of Palestine became involved only at the last minute, and then primarily as an outgrowth of inter-Arab rivalry rather than as a unified action against an emerging "colonialist" state. In addition, the Arab states which did finally send forces to oppose the Jews were themselves not truly independent and viable entities, but a collection of systemically dominated, non representative regimes.

As for the Universal Actor, the United Nations was only three years old at the time of the first Arab-Israeli war; its membership largely a homogenous grouping of ex-colonial powers. Consequently, it was unable to exercise any practical measure of control over the regional conflict.

SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the weakening of the systemic powers' control over the Middle East regional system of confrontation. This dissolution of control accompanied the transformation of the international system from one of increasingly rigid "balance

of power," into a relatively bipolar system. It may be argued, that the subsystemic challenge to the systemic dominance of the system and the success of that challenge was an aberration due to the fact that the first Arab-Israeli war occurred during a period of transition from one international system to another. The old "essential actors" were becoming less so, and the new bloc leaders were just beginning to formulate their objectives in the contest for systemic dominance. Therefore, this author prefers to view the subsystemic challenge to the international order as an unfocused one; one in which the subsystemic actors were able to wrest the initiative away from the systemic actors because the system was in a state of flux, and away from the universal actor because its role could not be defined until the blocs had coalesced around their leaders.

The following chapter will deal with the transformation of the unstructured regional actors into true coherent actors and the consequent focusing of the challenge to the international system. It will also move away from Kaplan's theory of international systems and closer to that of Oran Young.

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V. DEFINED SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A BIPOLAR/POLITICALLY DISCONTINUOUS INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The years immediately after the first Arab-Israeli war saw marked changes in the participants in that war. This chapter will examine some of those changes, including the emergence of modern Arab nations, the growing independence of the state of Israel, and the changing relationships of the major systemic actors to the Middle East subsystem. During the course of this examination, some of Kaplan's terminology and theories will be exchanged for the system of Political Discontinuities espoused by Oran Young.¹ To begin with, a survey of the major problem faced by Arab nationalism and the effect of the creation of the state of Israel upon it, is on order.

ARAB POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY

One of the major problems faced by the Arabs during the first Arab-Israeli war was that of trying to solidify the support of diffuse Arab entities in the task of ridding themselves of the challenge of Israel. The primary reason that this discipline was lacking and that there was little solidarity among the Arab forces is the fundamental concern of Arab politics: the problem of legitimacy. As David Easton puts it:

"The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor of the authorities and of the regime. A member may be willing to obey the authorities and conform to the requirements of the regime for many different reasons. But the most stable support will

derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run."²

If the Arab states were to effectively challenge the state of Israel, therefore, it is essential that the leadership of those states be considered legitimate. To approach the legitimacy problem of an Arab state without reference to conditions and issues common to all Arabs, or to what many Arabs refer to as the Arab nation, would result in an incomplete analysis.³ One of the factors external to a particular state which nonetheless has a great effect upon perceived legitimacy of that states' regime is what Clovis Mahsoud, a Lebanese, referred to as all-Arab core concerns. The legitimacy of given leaders in a given state is determined to a great degree by their espousal of these core concerns. At the present time, as Hudson points out, the foremost all-Arab concern is Palestine.⁴

EFFECTS IF THE 1948 WAR UPON THE "CONFRONTATION STATES"

JORDAN: There were dramatic changes to the political system of Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The Arab Legion held the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Eastern part (or old city section) of Jerusalem. In December of that year, a conference of West Bank

leaders proclaimed King Abdullah the King of Palestine, and by 1950 he formally annexed the territory. Thus was born the new nation of the Kingdom of Jordan. The state had a mixed population of relatively sedentary and better educated Palestinians on the one hand, and a traditional, Bedouin tribal society on the other. These two differing constituencies greatly complicated the ruling family's legitimacy problem. The nature of the internal tension which existed within the new kingdom harkened back to the classical Middle Eastern distinction between the desert and the settled societies, as expressed by Ibn Khaldun.⁵

As mentioned earlier, the problem of Arab legitimacy also involved an external dimension. In the case of Jordan it was the thrusting of the traditional land of Transjordan, which had been a relatively untroubled desert shaykdom, by means of the Palestinian conflict between Jews and Arabs, into the mainstream of Arab nationalism which had emerged since World War I.⁶ Jordan was certainly no bystander to the Palestinian trauma; it was directly involved. Although the successes of the Arab Legion in the war had improved Jordan's position in the Arab community, its longstanding association with Britain weighed against it.⁷ In addition, the regimes' Arab nationalist credentials were challenged by such competitors as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Much political hay was made of the fact that the same family that had won two kingdoms after the defeat of Arab nationalism in the First World War, had now joined with the new Jewish State in the partition of Palestine.⁸

EGYPT

The events in Palestine were undoubtedly an important determinant of the Weltanschauung of the Free Officers group which was to come to political power in Egypt. Although Nasir wrote that the 1948 war did not directly cause the revolution of 1952,⁹ it is clear that Palestine was a significant factor in unifying the Free Officers and precipitating their action. Nasir himself fought in Palestine and, according to Hudson, had contacts with Israelis officers when the force he was leading was surrounded.¹⁰ For Nasir, Palestine was not foreign soil, and its defense was "a duty imposed by self defense," for, he went on, "I believe that what is happening in Palestine could happen and may still happen tomorrow, in any part of this region, as long as it resigns itself to the factors and the forces which dominate it now."¹¹

SYRIA

Syrian politics has traditionally been family politics. Seale¹² enumerates the many factions in competition for political power and describes their inability to cooperate in the erection of a stable political order after the French withdrawal of 1946, even though the position of these elite families as a ruling class was threatened. This threat was a result of Syria's social mobilization, the popular appeal of new nationalist and socialist ideologies, and the "intolerable strain of defeat in the 1948 Palestine war."¹³ According to Hudson:

"As for Palestine, its impact was major and was felt in many ways. The Syrian army's inept performance in 1948 revealed the real dimension of Zionist power and made the Palestine struggle more of an issue than it had been before independence. It also crystallized the animosity between the military and the new nationalist establishment. The military were bitter about the civilian politician's misperception of the Israeli threat and their failure to have built up the army. The civilian notables, who generally considered the army a lower status social institution, were scathing in their criticisms of corruption within the military after the debacle . . . Palestine in short became an explosive issue, catalyzing perceptions of the incompetence of the upper-bourgeois nationalist elite, and as a manifestation of the need for Arab unity; on both counts the Ba'th, at least until the middle 1970's was the most successful of all competing groups in exploiting this legitimacy resource."¹⁴

LEBANON

The legacy of the 1948 war took longer to manifest itself in Lebanon than in the other confrontation states. Although Lebanon had traditionally sought to maintain strong ties to the west, it did, of necessity as an Arab state, support the Arab war against Israel. Since the loss of that war, however, Palestinian refugees have comprised a large and significant community in Lebanon, not just in refugee camps but also in the major cities where many of them prospered. Consequently when the pro-Israeli policy of the United States provoked anti-American demonstrations, they were, due to the pro-western bias of the Maronite elite, less violent than those in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt. As early as June 1951, Lebanon's delegate to the United Nations made a speech foreshadowing Lebanon's

de facto recognition of the state of Israel, even referring to the role that Israel would play, along with the Arab States, in defending the Middle East from extra-regional aggression.¹⁵ The internal tensions arising from the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, and the growing numbers and political influence of the Palestinian refugees would fester under Lebanon's cosmopolitan surface and eventually erupt, with disastrous results.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISRAELI NATIONAL ACTOR

With the 1947 announcement by the British of their intention to bring to an end their mandate in Palestine, the Zionist leadership took immediate steps in order to bring fruition their long held plans for an independent Jewish State. In response to Arab objections to the creation of such a state, many Zionists, affected by both their Western images of the backward and violent Arab, and their experiences or knowledge of the horrors of Nazi dominated Europe, believed that the Arabs planned to overrun Palestine and drive them into the sea. Not only were they of one mind in that those things should not occur, they actually were exhilarated by the prospect of being in charge of their own destinies.¹⁶

The establishment of the state of Israel and its recognition by virtually every Western state, was indeed a victory for the Zionists. The military defeat of the Arab armies did not bring with it a resolution of the conflict, however. Neither the Palestinians nor the Arab government were willing to acknowledge their military defeat as a sign of Israel's success. For its part, Israel's policy towards the Arab states

during this period was largely determined by two factors: (1) the pending territorial aims of the Zionist movement, prefiguring the current call for "secure borders," and (2) the refusal of the Palestinians to accept their displacement from their homeland.¹⁷

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod defines, therefore, the three major objectives of Israel's Arab policy:

"... first, to break the back of what remained of Palestinian resistance; second, to serve notice to the adjacent states that, should they harbor Palestinian resistance movements in territories under their jurisdiction, they would automatically invite intervention by Israeli armed forces in their domestic affairs; and third, to maintain a high but tolerable level of tension on Israel's frontiers in order to serve the internal political purposes of the state - namely, strengthening the bond of its citizens and consolidating its hold over external supporters."¹⁸

Acting upon these goals, Israel worked to develop the military capability which would lead to Arab acceptance of Israel, as constituted after 1948. Although Arab opposition was viewed as unrealistic and irrational, Israel avoided a large scale military confrontation with opposing Arab states as long as those states were predominantly concerned with internal problems and the continuing inter-Arab rivalries. As a result, there emerged a balance of power between Israel and the Arab states which allowed Israel to concentrate on its own internal development.¹⁹

The years immediately after the first Arab-Israeli war were marked by the development of Israeli political institutions and the building up of a military capability which was able to defeat potential Arab attacks.²⁰

The army became an excellent socializing structure for Jewish immigrants of diverse backgrounds. According to Ben-Gurion, "the persistent antagonism of the Arabs before the establishment of the state led to a more cohesive Jewish community in the country ... Since then, continued Arab enmity has been a stimulant to the development of Israel."²¹

In a similar fashion the economic challenge presented by the Arab boycott, while proving a minor deterrent to economic growth, fostered the autonomous development of the Israeli economy.²²

With operational codes strongly influenced by the recent experiences in Europe during the Nazi reign of terror, the Israeli leadership maintained that not only did the Arabs seek the elimination of the Israeli state; they sought the eradication of its people as well. Consequently, with the exception of Jordan's King Abdullah, no direct negotiations were entered into with any of the Arab leadership. Abdullah himself was assassinated in 1951 before any of these bilateral talks could come to fruition.²³

Consistent with its belief that only force or the threat of force would convince the Arab states to sue for peace and act to restrain Palestinian political and military activities originating within their borders, Israel began to apply a program of systemic attack and reprisal along the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armistice lines.²⁴

CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

If the identities of the regional actors were changing and becoming more focused, changes were occurring in the United Nations as well.

Starting with fifty-one members in 1945, the organization, during its early years, had been pre-occupied with and influenced by the interests of those essentially European states. However, by 1955, the process of decolonization, which had marked the post-1945 political system, began to be reflected in the membership of the United Nations. By 1955, the percentage of the United Nations membership composed of newly emerged states had increased from zero percent to thirteen percent.²⁵ As the leading bloc actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, competed for the support of the new Afro-Asian states, which were achieving political influence in the U.N. due to the increasingly permissive admission policies of that organization,²⁶ As a result of these policies, the composition of the General Assembly of 1955 was much different from that of the first decade. Four of the sixteen states admitted in 1955 were communist countries and six were either Asian or African states.²⁷ By 1965, there were thirty-one African states, thirteen Arab states, seventeen Asian states and ten communist states amongst the membership of the Assembly.²⁸ The emergence of these new states not only influenced the character and decision making process of the United Nations, but affected the stability of the bipolar international political system as well.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Kaplan has written that, even under the best conditions, a bipolar system cannot be expected to possess the inherent stability of a "balance

of power" international system.²⁹ In his bipolar model, the uncommitted states were expected to play a major role, both within and without the structure of a universal actor such as the United Nations, in the search for systemic stability. These uncommitted states of the model were envisioned as being similar to the modern developed states of Europe, and Kaplan argues that the system would indeed be more stable if they were. Empirically, however, these states have turned out to be new and undeveloped, remembering a resented colonial past. Further, they have suffered from social and racial prejudice and have in turn their own prejudices against the ex-colonial nations, which are all Western nations, and with which the United States is identified.³⁰

"These facts provide the experience which helps to mold the uncommitted states, to shape their picture of the world, and to determine their attitudes to other nations. That these new nations, for the most part, are revolutionary, not merely in the sense of wanting independence, but also in the sense of wanting political and social changes, that they are suspicious, determined, and in haste, are facts that affect the stability of the bipolar system and that weigh the clash between the United States and the Soviet Union."³¹

The emergence of these new, uncommitted states leads to a re-assessment of the continuing validity of Kaplan's bipolar model. Immediately following the Second World War, the dominance of the two superpowers became so evident that bipolarity appeared to be the most accurate representation of reality. During these years, although individual actors appeared whose interaction was within a given region, well

defined regional subsystems were in only a formative stage. These subsystems, the Middle East, for example, were either dominated by the superpowers or sufficiently peripheral so as to not disturb the essentially bipolar orientation of the international system.³² Oran Young points to development in more recent years which challenge the appropriateness of the bipolar axis in international politics:³³

- (1) As the period of time since a large scale war lengthened, there was no polarization to simplify the patterns of international politics.
- (2) There has been a gradual diffusion of effective power within the system. The very preponderance of the physical power, of the superpowers, as manifested by their nuclear capabilities, has occasionally constrained their freedom of action vis a vis a regional power.
- (3) New power centers of major significance have arisen, even though they are still far less influential than the superpowers.
- (4) The demise of colonialism ended a major simplifying factor of earlier periods of international politics, leading to the rapidly growing number of new independent states since 1945.
- (5) There has been a general rise in levels of political consciousness and a spread of active nationalism among the new states.

- (6) The superpowers, while continuing to compete for influence in the various regional subsystems are becoming aware of certain areas where their interests overlap and where cooperation benefits them both.

Young concludes, therefore, that:

"The upshot of all these developments is that the major simplifying assumptions of the bipolar world of the fifties either are no longer valid or are increasingly hedged about by a variety of complicating relationships on a subsidiary level. The regional subsystems, therefore, are now coming more and more into their own as a complement to the global nature of the overall international system."

It is my opinion that the characteristics of Young's political discontinuities model first began emerging in the mid-fifties, with the Hungarian Revolution in Europe and the Suez crisis in the Middle Eastern subsystem. It is to this crisis that we will now direct our inquiry.

THE SUEZ CONFLICT

Upon Nasir's assumption of political power in Egypt, he was confronted by a morass of domestic and foreign problems requiring solution. Although the Israeli victory in the first Arab-Israeli conflict had exposed the weakness of the Egyptian army, the period of relative entente which accompanied Moshe Sharett's tenure as Israeli premier did not force Nasir to take steps to correct the deficiencies. In February 1955, however, the concluding month of the Sharett regime, the Lavon-Affair - designed by the Israelis' to influence the British to maintain their forces in Egypt - brought militant Ben-Gurion back into power in Israel. One

week later, Israel resumed its earlier abrogated policy of massive retaliation for forays of individual armed Palestinians into Israel.³⁴

As Israeli attacks along the Egyptian border continued, Nasir fell under increasing pressure from his domestic power base, the army. One motive for the resolution of 1952 had been, after all, the humiliating Egyptian defeat of 1948. Many Egyptian officers, including Nasir himself, had attributed the defeat, at least in part, to the poor and malfunctioning arms with which, due to the corruption of prior royal regimes, they had been sent into battle.³⁵ In February 1955, the Israeli army attacked Egyptian military outposts in Gaza. This raid provided the "turning point" in Egypt's relationship as regional bloc leader with the leaders of the systemic blocs.³⁶

These Israeli raids seriously undermined Nasir's main source of regime legitimacy: the army. According to General Burna, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Forces:

"Shortly before the raid, he (Nasir) had visited Gaza and told the troops that there was no danger of war; that the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line was not going to be a battlefield. After that, many of them had been shot in their beds. Never again could he risk telling the troops they had no attack to fear; never again could he let them believe that they could relax their vigilance. It was for this reason that he could not issue and enforce strict orders against the opening of fire on the Israeli patrols which marched along the demarcation line, a hundred meters or less from the Egyptian positions. These positions were held by the friends and perhaps the relatives of the men who had perished in the Israeli ambush of the bloody night."³⁷

Nasir's quest for arms was complicated by the so-called Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by the three main Western powers, the United States, Britain and France, in which they pledged themselves to action, within or without the United Nations, to resist any attempt by either Israel or the Arabs to change the 1949 armistice lines by force of arms. Consequently, they refused to supply arms to the Arab states and Israel except "for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole."³⁸ Nasir, on the other hand had to face the indignation of the Palestinians in their riots and demonstrations which threatened the stability of his young and relatively insecure regime. Mob violence spread from Gaza, to Yunis, to Rafah. As Egyptian soldiers entered these areas to restore calm, they were greeted with stones and shouts of "arms, give us arms, we shall defend ourselves."³⁹ Consequently, Nasir was pressured into obtaining a source of new arms as soon as possible. Although President Eisenhower described Egypt's request for \$20 million worth of arms as sheer "peanuts," the United States insisted on payment in hard currency, fully aware that Egypt, with total reserves of \$20 million would be unable to agree.⁴⁰ Consequently, Nasir announced, in September of 1955, that Czechoslovakia would supply large quantities of late model military equipment to Egypt via a barter arrangement for Egyptian cotton.

This arrangement was met with concern in the United States, for it appeared that the 'northern tier' defense line had been sealed by the

Soviets. Nonetheless, in Polk's words:

"Nasser had done what no other Arab had thought possible. He had used the Cold War to internationalize Arab affairs and so, apparently, gained a lever to extract better terms from both the West and the East."⁴¹

In addition, he had done it at a relatively modest price. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "the terms of the Czechoslovak arms deal appear to have been very favorable: prices were low and payment was in cotton. There was no need to attach political strings. As Nasir said, 'These were entirely unconditional. We simply had to pay their cost . . . These arms now belong to us.' It was the first example of pre-emptive supply."⁴²

Yet another major decision was taken by Nasir at approximately this same time, in the wake of the Gaza raid. Hitherto, the infiltration of individual Palestinian guerillas into Israeli territory had not been recognized or overtly supported by any legitimate Arab regime. Yet, in August, Nasir incorporated the fedayeen - those who sacrifice themselves - into the framework of Egyptian foreign policy. As a matter of fact, their first raid began on the same day that Nasir finally committed himself to the purchase of Soviet arms.⁴³

The Western powers, still hoped to keep Egypt within their sphere of influence. Consequently, when the Egyptian government announced plans to construct a new high dam at Aswan, which, by increasing the country's hydroelectric supply, would form the basis of Egypt's development

program, a provisional agreement was reached, in February, 1956, whereby the World Bank would loan \$200 million on the condition that the United States and Britain agreed to loan another \$70 million.⁴⁵ According to Lenczowski, these offers were made with an understanding that Egypt would provide matching funds and that it would not accept Soviet aid.⁴⁶

In the meanwhile, the Soviets had expressed an interest in financing the project, and the Egyptian press continued to attack the United States and the West for what it considered excessive restrictions upon the furnishings of economic and military aid. In addition, Egypt, antagonized the West, and the United States in particular by recognizing Communist China on 16 May, 1956. There is some dispute as to Egypt's motive for extending recognition to China. Some feel it was yet another act of defiance aimed toward the West, while others, Safran, in particular, view the recognition as merely the establishment of an alternative source of arms.⁴⁷

Whatever the reason for Egypt's recognition of China, it was the final factor leading up to the United States' refusal to assist in the financing of the project on 19 July, 1956, claiming that the Egyptian economy was too unstable for such a large undertaking. As a result, Nasser announced in Alexandria, on 26 July that the Suez Canal Company was nationalized and that the Canal would be managed henceforth by an Egyptian Canal Authority. He declared Egypt's intention to build the

High Dam with the revenues of the Canal and said that if the imperialist powers did not like it they could "choke on their rage."⁴⁸

Britain responded to this move by organizing a movement to place the Canal under international supervision, and called for a conference to discuss the matter in London. The majority of the participants (including the United States, opposed the use of military force to wrest control from Nasir's regime and place it in the hands of an international administration). Thus, there was no possibility of imposing extra-regional control through co-operative international action. The next move of the British and French governments was to remove all of their pilots from the Canal Company in an effort to force the closing of the waterway. Nasir, however, through the use of Egyptian pilots as well as some from sympathetic countries, was actually able to increase canal traffic.

Subsequently, the French, British, and Israeli governments entered into an agreement at Sevres, France in 24 October, which called for an Israeli attack upon Egyptian territory, aided by the British and the French. In terms of risk, the Israelis stood to lose little and gain much, including the opening of the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. As for the French, they were already involved, in Algeria, in a war against Arab nationalism, and thus stood to profit from the overthrow of the regime which it felt aided and abetted the Algerian rebels. Britain, on the other hand, stood to seriously weaken her diminished, but still considerable interest in the sub-system.⁴⁹

On 29 October, the Israeli army invaded Sinai and captured all of it, including the island of Tiran in the Gulf of Aqaba. Their advance took just four days. On 30 October, both Britain and France issued an ultimatum calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli and Egyptian forces to ten kilometers from the Canal, and threatening Anglo-French intervention to see that it was carried out.⁵⁰ Considering that the Israeli forces were nowhere near the canal at the time the ultimatum was issued, their "withdrawal" would have actually meant a substantial advance. On 31 October, subsequent to Egyptian rejection of the ultimatum, British and French planes began to attack Egyptian airfields and broadcast stations. On 5 November, an Anglo-French invasion force captured Port Said and began to move south along the canal.⁵¹

The United States attempted to obtain the withdrawal of the invading forces through both direct pressure upon the respective governments and through diplomatic initiatives at the United Nations. Although the Soviet Union seconded the United States' effort in the United Nations, and sent diplomatic messages to the participants, it was relatively ineffective in actually coercing the protagonists to a cease fire.⁵² As Sadat states in his autobiography, Shukri Al-Kuwatli, the Syrian president was on an official visit to the Soviet Union during the time of the heaviest fighting.

"He spoke to the Soviet leaders about the Canal battle and asked them to extend a helping hand to Egypt. However, they refused point blank, whereupon Al-Kuwatli sent word to us to that effect and advised us to rely upon ourselves, as no hope at all could be pinned on the Soviet Union. This made me believe, from that moment on, that it was always futile to depend on the Soviet Union."⁵³

On 6 November, the British and French accepted an American instigated cease fire and declared their intention to withdraw from occupied territories as soon as the United Nations Emergency Force could take over their positions. On 8 November, Israel agreed to withdraw from most of the territory it had occupied, although full withdrawal would not occur for another six months, and that only due to the threat of international economic sanctions.

SUEZ AFTERMATH: SOME THOUGHTS ON LINKAGE POLITICS

Linkage politics has to do with the relationship between the units under investigation and their environment.⁵⁴ Thus, linkages can exist between the domestic politics of a given state and its international behavior, as well as between regional events and the structure of the extra-regional political system. Thus, Nasir's decision to go ahead with the Czech arms deal may be seen as operating on at least three levels:

- (1) DOMESTIC. Nasir's domestic political base was dependent upon the support of the Egyptian military. The weapons which they possessed were not the equal of Israel's, and as a result of the West's hesitancy to supply the quantity of arms which Nasir felt was needed, he was pressured to obtain an alternate source of supply.
- (2) REGIONAL. In his quest for leadership of the emerging Arab nationalist movements, Nasir's decision to turn his back upon the ex-colonial powers and deal instead with

their systemic rival was seen as an act of heroism and helped reinforce his legitimacy as a regional leader.

- (3) GLOBAL. Nasir's decision affected the United States-Soviet competition for influence in the Middle East. Thus, the arms agreement led to additional Soviet economic and military aid, and resulted in increased U.S. involvement in order to maintain its influence in the region against Soviet advances.

Conversely, occasionally the linkages between foreign and domestic affairs work in an unexpected manner. For example, the joint Anglo-French attack upon Egypt had as one of its goals the weakening of the Egyptian political regime which they perceived as inimicable to their regional interests. Rather than weakening domestic support for Nasir, however, the air raids on Egyptian soil served only to bolster his popularity.⁵⁵

Linkages between foreign and domestic policies do not exist solely amongst the regional actors, however. It has been argued that American reluctance to aid in the financing of the Aswan High Dam was as much the result of domestic politics as it was a coherent foreign policy. According to Lenczowski, Egypt's request for Western aid in the financing of the Dam was rebuffed not only because of Nasir's tilt toward the Soviets, but because of the "opposition by southern senators fearful of the competition of Egyptian cotton should the Dam be constructed and by a few western senators anxious to secure funds for similar projects in their home states."⁵⁶

One other major result of the Suez Canal Crisis was the diminution of British and French influence in the area, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union alone to vie for influence. In this regard, it seems that the "collusion" between the Soviet Union and the United States in applying pressure on the British, French and Israelis to withdraw came as a surprise to the partners in the campaign. It can be supposed that the Israelis, French and English, upon commencing hostilities, found the international situation encouraging. First, they believed that the Soviet Union would probably be deterred from action by the United States. Second, they assumed that although the United States did not support the tripartite attack against Egypt, it would probably not take definitive action against it just a few days before the American presidential election. Finally, they believed that the countries of the region were weak enough that a quick and successful military operation might achieve their objectives with minimal regional and international costs, such as alliance rifts, international negative reactions, and so on.⁵⁷ Thus, the intensity of joint United States-Soviet Union pronouncements and diplomatic activity against the campaign came as a demoralizing blow. The resultant withdrawal of British and French influence in the area thus destroyed the possibility of the rivalry between the two superpowers being effectively mediated or moderated by the action of other powers as used to happen in the classical balance of power system. This withdrawal of British and French influence is mentioned by former President Nixon as one of the reasons he feels American policy during the crisis was in error:

"Eisenhower and Dulles put heavy public pressure on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Suez. In retrospect I believe that our actions were a serious mistake. Nasser became even more rash and aggressive than before, and the seeds of another Mideast war were planted. The most tragic result was that Britain and France were so humiliated and discouraged by the Suez crisis that they lost the will to play a major role on the world scene. From this time forward the United States would by necessity be faced to "go it alone" in the foreign policy leadership of the free world. I have often felt that if the Suez crisis had not arisen during the heat of a presidential election campaign a different decision would have been made."⁵⁸

It should not be assumed, however, that the Middle East was in the "middle" between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear that the great power relationship had and continues to have an important bearing on Middle Eastern affairs, but the latter may not be understood wholly or even primarily in terms of the major international system. If that major system can be considered as being bipolar, the subsystem demonstrated that there was near equality in the roles of each Middle Eastern state, an equality limited only by domestic political circumstances. These factors added up to an inherently unstable system. And one in which the ability of the major or systemic actors to coerce regional actors to serve extra-regional interests was rapidly diminishing.

1956-1967

At first glance, the powers that had invaded Egypt in 1956 seemed to have gained little from their initiative, since Nasir remained in power and the invading armies were all required to withdraw. As for Israel,

it achieved only the opening of the Straits of Tiran so that the port of Eilat might be used. This opening was not incorporated in any formal treaty, and thus, the subsequent Egyptian assertion of its right to close what it regarded as territorial water to Israeli shipping was a major contributing cause to the outbreak of fighting a decade later.⁵⁹ There was, however, very real significance in the United Nations Emergency Force which had interposed itself between Egyptian and invading forces in the Suez Canal Zone and then was moved to the truce line between Israel and Egypt. According to Quester, such a force changed the calculations and miscalculations on possible wars in three important ways:⁶⁰

- (1) The presence of these forces as observers and hostages reduced the mutual fear of sudden sneak attacks since each side knew that the other was much more likely to launch an attack while these forces were in the way. Consequently, there was an easing of the "prisoner's dilemma"⁶¹ problem as each side had an added incentive to wait and see in a future crisis.
- (2) The UN force made it more difficult for either side to carry on a war of endurance by the guerrilla-terrorist campaigns that had characterized the sector prior to 1956.
- (3) Nasir's acceptance of the forces had the effect of reducing Arab expectations that he would be the initiator of a new

military campaign against Israel. Thus, Nasir was able to avoid an open admission of defeat, and yet have a convenient excuse for not resuming warfare.

If the UNEF forces prevented guerrilla attacks on the Sinai border, the attacks continued on other fronts. Fedayeen raids from Jordan and Syria continued, while in the Arab capitals there was hope that these raids presaged a victorious Arab revenge in the future.⁶²

Throughout the latter part of 1956, the Fedayeen raids into Israel, sometimes moving through Jordan or Lebanon, but for the most part mounted in Syria, grew in numbers and in intensity. Israel appealed to the United Nations Security Council, however, a resolution proposed by six of its members, calling on Syria to take stronger methods to prevent such incidents, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁶³

A new, radical Syrian regime had come to power as the result of a coup d'etat earlier that year. It supported the so-called Palestine Liberation Army, which had mobilized some of the refugees and carried out some of the raids. The Syrian Prime Minister, in response to the attempted United Nations resolution declared: "We are not the sentinels over Israel's security and are not the leash that restrains the revolution of the displaced and persecuted Palestinian people." Furthermore, a "defense agreement" was concluded between Syria and the United Arab Republic, which included a joint military command and other measures of "coordination and integration between the two countries."⁶⁴

On the 13th of November, 1966, Israel launched a retaliatory raid against Es Samu, a Jordanian village, where, according to United Nations observers, eighteen Jordanian soldiers and civilians were killed, and fifty-four wounded. The fact that Jordan rather than Syria was the target of this retaliation evoked sharp criticism in the international community. Although Israel explained its activity by citing thirteen recent acts of sabotage committed on Israeli territory from Jordanian bases, the consequences of this disproportionate and misplaced retaliation were considerable.

The United Nations Security Council censured Israel for a large scale military action in violation of the United Nations charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. Further, the Jordanian Prime Minister charged that the Egyptian and Syrian regimes were not bearing their share of the weight of the confrontation with Israel, in a attempt to provoke them to action.⁶⁵

From January to April, 1967, the Syrian-Israeli border was frequently disturbed by skirmishes between the opposing sides. Nasir, for his part, was being pressured to make good on his rhetorical diatribes against Israel and the West, particularly the United States. Harkabi accurately describes the self fulfilling prophecy of Arab rhetoric thus:

"Let us assume that Arab leaders express opinions about Israel in which they do not believe at all. The result then would be the creation of a gap or dissonance between their words and opinions or beliefs. Such a gap makes people feel uncomfortable,

and they would therefore like to narrow it down ... As a result of this process, the authors of the declarations tend to believe in their own statements."⁶⁶

On the other hand, it appears that as early as 1965, Nasir attempted to counter the verbal brinkmanship of the other Arab states. Addressing a Palestinian audience, he said:

"They say 'drive out UNEF.' Suppose that we do. Is it not essential to have a plan? If Israeli aggression takes place against Syria, do I attack Israel? That would mean that Israel is the one to determine the battle for me. It hits a tractor or two to force me to move; is this a wise way? It is we who must determine the battle."⁶⁷

Much has been written concerning the passing of erroneous information concerning Israeli troop buildups, to the Egyptians by the Soviets. The question which comes to mind is whether the Soviets were deliberately trying to provoke a war between the two states. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the Soviet Union had made a large investment in the new Syrian regime. The regime, in turn, not only paid loud and frequent homage to Marxist slogans, but also included a few avowed Communist ministers in the government. Consequently, the protection of the Syrian regime became a vested interest for those within the Soviet leadership which had encouraged a policy of large scale assistance.⁶⁸

The Syrian government, whose domestic programs met with antipathy, sought to bolster its support by engaging in a vehement anti-Israeli policy. Consequently, in order to provide support for the regime, the Soviets sought to influence Nasir into a token demonstration of

support for the Syrian anti-Israeli campaign. In order to do this, they provided the Egyptians with a copy of an Israeli contingency plan which called for a large scale attack against Syrian positions, without making it clear that it was, in fact, a contingency plan.⁶⁹

Thus, although Nasir, unable to obtain verification of the Soviet claim of "up to eleven divisions" of Israeli troops concentrating on the Syrian border, must have known the information to be false, he set in force the mobilization which was to begin the crisis:

"Nasir must not only have known that the information was false, but he must have also figured that the Russians knew that it was false, and knew he knew it was false. In that case, he could only interpret the Russian move as an invitation to him to join them in spreading the false charges against Israel and to use this as an excuse to stir up the question of Israeli-Arab military relations with their implicit support ...

A second, no less crucial reason why Nasir decided to act as if the Russian information were true is that in a certain particular sense he believed it to be essentially true. He knew that there were no Israeli concentrations at that time, but he was convinced that an Israeli large scale attack on Syria was very likely to take place sooner or later. The reason for this conviction is that for some time he had been expecting the United States to try to destroy him, and he looked on the tension between Syria and Israel as offering the United States a good opportunity to use Israel in order to hit him indirectly by hitting at Syria. In other words, Nasir had reached, through his own independent thinking, conclusions that were quite similar to those of the Russians."⁷⁰

On 14 May 1967, Nasir sent military units towards the Suez canal and the Sinai, ostensibly in response to the "information" considered

above. At 1430 (Egyptian time) the state of alert of Egyptian forces was raised to "maximum alert" or "battle readiness" while on 15 May, the anniversary of Israeli independence, Israel staged a military parade through the demilitarized section of Jerusalem. On 16 May, Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Fawzi, sent a telegram to the commander of the United Nations Emergency force, General Indarjit Rihkye, ordering him to withdraw at once. In New York, U Thant met with Egyptian representatives to the United Nations and attempted to moderate the Egyptian position by insisting that if the UNEF forces in the Sinai were to be withdrawn, he would have to withdraw the forces at Sharm el Sheikh as well.

It can be seen, therefore, that Nasir was not able to remain free of this "Prisoner's Dilemma" if he were to maintain his position as leader of the Arab world. If Israeli attacks were expected against Syria, he may have felt compelled to join in. Consequently, it was imperative that Nasir share the risks of war borne by Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. In order to do this, he was compelled to give up whatever peace insurance was provided by the UNEF forces still arrayed along the Sinai border. While Nasir's expulsion of the Emergency Force does not prove a desire on his part for an Egyptian-Israeli war, it was a conscious choice to accept the increased risk of such a war.

Nasir's moves did catch Israel somewhat by surprise. However, the general feeling in Israel was that these latest military maneuvers

were still designed simply to be a "demonstrative show of solidarity with Syria," and that Egypt was "still opposed to military confrontation with Israel."⁷¹

Tension continued to build in the region and probably reached the "point of no return" on 22 May 1967. Following a meeting of the Higher Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Nasir announced in a speech that the straits of Tiran were closed to Israeli shipping; both goods carried on Israeli ships and ships of other nations bound for Eilat would be barred. He declared that "the Israeli flag shall not go through the Gulf."⁷² The closure of the Straits was regarded by the Israelis as a *causus belli*, and was declared as much in 1956.⁷³

Both Lacqueur and Yost⁷⁴ seem to agree that the Soviets had not been consulted prior to the closure of the straits, however, once the decision had been taken, the Soviet leaders faced a serious dilemma. The Soviet government had stated publicly that it would support the Arabs, on the other hand, however, they had made it known directly to Nasir that they would not support a Jihad, a holy war, against Israel as the Arabs proclaimed. Soviet policy at this point was to give political support to Nasir while working for a peaceful solution to the crisis which would help consolidate Arab gains. Soviet public pronouncements at the time were extremely anti-American, accusing the United States of having fueled the crisis in an attempt to divert world attention from its involvement in Vietnam. Later, anti-American statements were toned down;

clearly negotiations with Washington had gotten under way and the super-powers had established ground rules for the dispute. America and Russia would not intervene and they would both work for a de-escalation of the conflict. Both Washington and Moscow sent notes to that effect to both Cairo and Tel Aviv, but while Nasir promised that he would not fire first, his major spokesman, Muhammad Heikal, announced that war was inevitable.⁷⁵

Then, on 30 May, King Hussein of Jordan flew to Cairo for a meeting with Nasir and signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt, placing the Jordanian army under Egyptian command. The final action that Israel had long said would serve as a causus belli had been taken. For those who had held out hope of a diplomatic solution, the point of no return had been reached. As seen in Israel, the military union of the two erstwhile enemies could serve no other purpose but as preparation for an attack on Israel. In addition, this latest action by the Arabs intensified the political division within Israel between the "hawks" and the "doves." The "hawks" scored a victory as the result of Moshe Dayan's inclusion in the cabinet as Minister of Defense, an act not to be overlooked by Nasir who stated that he now saw war as imminent. And, indeed, it was: Israeli air strikes against the Arab positions began at 0845 Cairo time, 5 June, 1967.

On the Arab side of the conflict, Gamal Abdul Nasir was reacting to his weakened position both at home and throughout the Arab world by

by re-asserting his position as the foremost proponent of Arab militarism. The other Arab states, did not want to see Nasir obtain an easy political victory by merely outbluffing the Israelis. Such a victory for Nasir might weaken their own regimes, especially those of conservative Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan). As a result, their public statements either matched Nasir's in bellicosity, or attempted to outdo him, all of which only fanned the flames of the conflict.

As for the Israelis, three major stimuli can be identified as prompting their decision to attack. First, the movement of Egyptian troops across the Canal and the concomitant demand for the withdrawal of UNEF forces, was perceived as a radical shift from the more "normal" events of belligerency to which they had become used. Second, the closure of the Straits of Tiran, which had been a causus belli in 1956, was presented to the Israelis as a fait accompli which had erased all the gains of the 1956 Suez campaign. While Israel had cause for alarm over Sinai, the closure of the straits was seen as the direct threat of war. Finally, the 30 May meeting of King Hussein and Nasir in Cairo completed the Israeli perception that war was not only inevitable, but imminent.⁷⁶

THE THIRD ROUND

There have been countless books and articles written about the actual conduct of the Six Day War. Consequently, only a brief summary will be presented in these pages:⁷⁷

On 5 June, 1967, Israel attacked seventeen Egyptian airfields and destroyed most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. With complete command of the air, Israeli forces won an easy victory in Sinai and reached the Suez Canal early on 9 June. After the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force, the Israelis turned against Jordan. On 7 June, after the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank had fallen to Israeli forces, Jordan accepted the United Nations Security Council's demand for a cease-fire. Egypt accepted on the following day. With Egypt and Jordan out of action, the Israelis turned against Syria, stormed up the Golan Heights and occupied the town of Quneitra on the Syrian Plateau. The Syrians accepted the cease-fire on 10 June. Contingents of Algerian, Sudanese, and Kuwaiti troops sent to the Suez Canal front did not arrive in time to affect the fighting.

Among the systemic actors, the Soviet Union mounted a massive resupply effort upon the cessation of hostilities, although the new aircraft deliveries were on order prior to the 5 June initiation of combat operations. According to Aviation Week, within ten days of the cease-fire of 10 June, "40 MIG-21 fighter aircraft from Algeria and 60 from Czechoslovakia had arrived at UAR airfields." An additional 50 MIG's were believed to have arrived from other East European countries, through which the Soviets may have decided to disguise further aid to the Arab nations.

At the same time, Israeli trade specialists were implementing plans to resupply their own air force, in the face of a French arms embargo. As a result the United States emerged as the principal supplier of arms to Israel, and Britain and France's influence in the area continued to decline. It should be noted, however, that both America and the Soviet Union's resupply efforts reached their peak after the cessation of hostilities.

EFFECT OF THE WAR ON REGIONAL/SYSTEMIC RELATIONS

The military resupplying of client states who are the direct protagonists in a crisis or war may be seen, not as a coercive bargaining tactic, but simply as a means by which the major systemic actors can help their regional clients while avoiding direct confrontation between themselves. They are able to bring power to bear in support of their conflicting interests, but are able to shift responsibility for its violent use to a proxy. However, if the major systemic powers also have a common interest in dampening conflicts between their clients, their capacity to supply them can also be given a bargaining interpretation. The suppliers, therefore, are in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" in which each tacitly communicates: "If you don't I won't" (cooperation) "but if you do, I will" (defection). In the 1967 war the United States and the Soviet Union were able to cooperate in abstinence, but, as will be demonstrated, in the 1973 war they were not. This development of military aid relationships added another rung on the escalation scale of the nuclear powers.

While it does provide flexibility of maneuver for the extra-regional actors, it also has risks: first, the risk that clients abundantly supplied with modern weapons are more likely to use them against each other, and second, the risk that the suppliers themselves might inadvertently become directly involved. The following are some additional observations made concerning the 1967 conflict:

- (1) The Israeli armed forces emerged as an acknowledged power in the Middle East.
- (2) The Soviet Union, although expected to suffer a setback in regional influence because of the defeat of its clients, instead increased its influence over the next few years.
- (3) Much of the increase in Soviet influence can be linked directly to their willingness to resupply their defeated clients. Nasir, on 23 July, 1968, in a speech at the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union at Cairo University stated:

"Had it not been for the Soviet Union, we would now find ourselves facing the enemy without any weapons and compelled to accept his conditions. The United States would not have given us a single round of ammunition. It has given us and will give us nothing, but it gives Israel everything, from guns to aircraft to missiles.⁷⁹

- (4) The United States emerged as guarantor of Israel's existence and as its primary source of arms.

Before leaving the period of the 1967 war, one additional point is relevant. Although the clients of the Soviet Union suffered what may

objectively be considered a defeat, and although there appears to have been certain recriminations amongst the Soviet leadership itself as to the error of supporting their Arab clients to the extent that they did, still the Soviet Union, of the two major systemic actors, must be judged the victor of this round of confrontation. The reason that this is so is that the Arab opinion makers, political leaders, and press, never acknowledged their "defeat." Instead, the war was treated as an example of Israeli aggression which the Arabs had finally been able to halt, thanks to the continuing flow of arms from their ally, the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Arab refusal to publicly admit defeat ameliorated what for the Soviets would have been the expected result of their defeat: a diminution of Soviet influence in the region.

What the above observation demonstrates is the manner in which the regional subsystem imprints itself upon systemic events. The fact of increasing Soviet influence in the region had nothing to do with any actions taken by the systemic actors, but had all to do with the purely regional requirement that the legitimacy of the Arab regimes not allow them to acknowledge defeat. This seeming perversity in system-sub-system interaction was to evolve still further in the next phase of the continuing conflict.

NOTES - V

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VI. EMERGING PATTERNS OF SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE

The period of time from the end of the Six Day War until the present has seen the Middle East subsystemic actors' challenge to the bipolar dominance of the international system come to maturity. Due to arms transfer policies pursued by the extra-regional suppliers, the growing independence of the international system on Middle East oil, and the increasing political independence of the subsystemic actors, the relationship between the global system and the subsystem may be described as subsystemically dominated. It appears that the Middle Eastern powers have achieved a level of independence of action since the Six Day War which may be compared to the earlier attainment of formal independence from the colonial system. This chapter will deal with the events following the war, and attempt to identify some of the factors which have contributed to the current state of system-subsystem relations.

TERRITORIAL THRUSTS AND DIPLOMATIC PARRIES

As a result of their victory in the 1967 war, the Israelis found themselves in possession of new Arab territories. Israel occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. The acquisition of this territory was not without its liabilities, however. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, in a study prepared for the Institute for Strategic Studies offered this perceptive account:

"... The Israelis may well look back with regret to the days when Israel was almost as homogeneous a Jewish State as its Zionist founders intended; for it will never be that again. Two and a half million Jews now control territory containing nearly a million and a half Arabs, and whatever settlement is made on the West Bank, Arabs are likely in the future to make up at least a quarter of Israel's population. Israel will be confronted with all the problems of a multi-racial society, in which the minority group is potentially hostile and sustained by powerful consanguinous supporters beyond the frontier.¹

The new territories are lacking in any significant natural resources with the exception of a small amount of oil in Sinai. As a result, the major significance of the occupied territories is political, strategic, and emotional. From the standpoint of politico-strategic value, the new territories, although they resulted in the multiplication of Jewish territory sevenfold, had, as their result, the reduction of the length of the pre-war borders by nearly one-third.² Emotionally, the significance of the occupied territories derives from their association with Jewish historical memory since biblical times. This is most true in regards the West Bank, the lands of Samaria and Judea, especially as regards the city of Jerusalem.³

It was Israeli attempts to reunify the divided city of Jerusalem which led to the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 17 June, 1967, calling upon Israel to "rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem."⁴ Ten days after the adoption of this resolution, Israel had not complied.

Consequently, the Assembly took "note with deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel of resolution 2253." As a result, it passed another resolution, 2254, reiterating the terms of the former.⁵ Israel once again refused to comply. There are several factors at work in Israel's refusal to evacuate the Old City of Jerusalem, not the least of which was its emotional and religious attachment for the holy city of Judaism. Nevertheless, one must also consider the steadfastness with which this regional actor was able to withstand systemic pressure, not merely from the United Nations as universal actor in the international system, but also from the United States itself, as one of the two major systemic actors and as guarantor of Israel's existence and the major supplier of aid and arms.

Despite continuing Israeli refusal to acquiesce to the request of the Assembly, the Security Council, on 22 November, 1967, passed a resolution which has been of paramount importance in any subsequent discussions of a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Resolution 242 was introduced by the British representative to the Council, Lord Caradon, and was unanimously adopted.⁶ Because of its continuing importance in the discussions concerning the Middle East conflict, it is reproduced here in its entirety:⁷

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
 - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories* occupied in the recent conflict,
 - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
 - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
 - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
 - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

*The word "the" before "territories" was omitted from the English text of the resolution, but the article is included in the French version. This discrepancy allowed for further compromise as to whether all or merely some of the territories were to be returned.

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Not only had the United States and the Soviet Union both supported the resolution to no avail, the United States unilaterally called again for its implementation in the 1969 Rogers Plan, in which U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, publicly endorsed substantial withdrawal from occupied territory in return for contractual peace with the Arabs.⁸

ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION 1968-1971

During the June war much of the Arab arsenal was lost. Moscow, however, moved quickly to replace the losses. Within ten days of the end of the war Soviet President Podgorny visited Cairo, and Soviet arms shipments to Egypt were immediately resumed. Within a year, of the first postwar shipments, Egypt had nearly regained its prewar numerical aircraft strength. The largest portion of the replacements, however, were with old fashioned MIG 15/17 type aircraft, while replenishments of the modern MIG-21 were slow in coming.⁹

For its part, the United States had effectively replaced Western Europe (and France in particular) as the main supplier of arms to Israel, beginning in 1969-71 with deliveries of 42 A-4H Skyhawk attack aircraft and 80 F-4 Phantoms. In fact, since shortly after the war the United

States has been the major Israeli supplier of aircraft, missiles, and armored fighting vehicles.¹⁰

In order to graphically present the quantitative and qualitative changes occurring in the transfer of arms into the subsystem in the interwar period, the following tables, drawn from data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies have been included. Although the tables are limited to combat aircraft inventories, they are indicative of the general trend of arms transfers in the region.

The years between the third and the fourth rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict were not years of peace; rather, these years witnessed a "war of attrition" between Nasir's Egypt and the Israelis. This war was fought with increasingly sophisticated weaponry, provided by the United States and the Soviet Union to their regional clients.¹¹ By late 1969, the Israeli air force was roaming at will over Cairo and the Nile Delta, not, as yet, dropping bombs, but intimidating the population by repeatedly breaking the sound barrier and creating "sonic booms." In early January, 1970, the Israelis embarked on "deep penetration" raids into the delta and the suburbs of the capital. Flying newly acquired American aircraft, they bombed the industrial installations at Kaanka, ten miles northeast of Cairo, then returned in February to bomb Abu-Zabal, two miles north of Kaanka, and killing 80 workers. In January, February, and March they bombed military factories at Helwa and Digla, causing

heavy damage and inhibiting Egypt's war production. On 8 April, 1970, they struck a primary school at Bahr-ul-Baqr, fifteen miles west of the Canal, killing 30 children.

In January, 1970 Nasir went to Moscow to request more effective air defense equipment. Although the Soviet Union declined to provide more sophisticated aircraft, such as the MIG-25, or Su-9 interceptors, it did agree to provide the SA-3 Surface to Air missile in order to counter Israeli incursions into Egyptian territory.¹³ It appears that one reason for the reluctance of the Soviets to provide the Egyptians with more sophisticated aircraft was the Soviet fear that such aircraft might be used in an offensive role, thus threatening superpower entanglement in the regional dispute on terms dictated by the subsystemic clients. Still the agreement to provide the air defense missiles did demonstrate Soviet willingness to help defend the Arab client states.

Furthermore, the Soviets agreed to supply approximately 150 pilots to Nasir, half of them as instructors and advisors, and the other half virtually a complete Soviet squadron, flying the latest MIG-21 fighters. Whereas earlier the Soviets had been advising the Egyptians as to how to use the older SA-2 rockets, the new SA-3's would be manned entirely by Russians. By late Spring, some 15,000 Soviet military advisors were in Egypt.¹⁴

The Egyptians were not the only ones to experience some uncertainty as to the reliability of their channels of arms supply. After the French

arms embargo of 1967, Israeli Premier Eshkol attempted to persuade President Johnson to supply modern aircraft to Israel. Although Johnson hesitated at first, the deliveries of the A-4 Skyhawks commenced three months after Eshkol's January 1968 visit to the United States, and in December that year it was decided to acquiesce to the Israeli request for the more sophisticated F-4 Phantom.¹⁵

The American decision to supply Israel came none too soon. President De Gaulle had imposed a total embargo on arms to Israel as a result of Israel's use of French helicopters in the raid on the Beirut airport of 28 December 1968. The development of an indigenous Israeli arms industry and the new American arms commitment helped counter any deleterious effect the French action may have had.¹⁶

As an example of the role which arms supplies to the regional protagonists plays in regional political decisions, it should be noted that it was after his return from his trip to the Soviet Union that Nasir agreed to accept the Rogers Peace Plan, because he now felt that Egypt had adjusted the military balance and could therefore begin negotiations with territorial security. On the night that the cease fire was to take place, however, Nasir moved the Soviet missiles closer to the Suez Canal, thus angering the American administration, and resulting in a U.S. pro-Israeli tilt which was to last for the next two years.

The decisions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union to supply their respective area clients were motivated by other factors than

altruism, or, for that matter, a simple desire to project systemic presence into the region. The "war of attrition" provided both weapons suppliers with an opportunity to test the effectiveness of their more sophisticated weapons against the weapons of their global rival, while using regional clients as their proxies.

THE WAR OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT

In early April, 1973, President Anwar el-Sadat, Nasir's successor as President of Egypt told a Newsweek reporter in an interview:

"If we don't take our case into our own hands, there will be no movement ... (toward a permanent Middle East solution) ... Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face by Israel with American blessings The situation is hopeless ... the time has come for a shock ... Everyone has fallen asleep over the Middle East crisis ... The Americans have left us no other way out ... Everything is now being mobilized for the resumption of battle which is now inevitable."¹⁷

Sadat's sense of frustration stemmed from the fact that despite his agreement in principle in 1971 to continue Egypt's acceptance of the Roger's Plan and to search for a permanent peace, Israel had made no move to withdraw from the territory it had occupied nearly seven years earlier. In addition, Sadat had, in 1972, expelled the Soviet military advisors and replaced them with Egyptians. This expulsion was but the culmination of a series of grievances with the Soviet Union, including, among other things, the Soviet policy of "no peace, no war" along the Suez front, the infringement of the massive Soviet military presence on

Egyptian sovereignty, and the Soviet failure to provide the modern arms requested by the Egyptians.¹⁸ Thus, Sadat found himself feeling increasingly isolated from the global system, and, in the face of renewed domestic pressure for action, more and more compelled to provide the "shock" that he had alluded to in his interview.

Beginning in January, 1973, Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Syria, carried out a series of mobilizations and maneuvers in the area of the west bank of the Suez canal and the Golan Heights. Each was accompanied by a series of Arab threats to "liberate" occupied territory. These mobilizations were seen by Israel as part of a general campaign designed to wear down the Israeli economy and morale.¹⁹

The basic problem which the Arab military posturings presented to the Israelis was that while the Egyptians maintain a large standing army, Israel's defense forces are geared to a large reserve contingent. As a result, continued mobilization of Israeli forces, such as the mobilization in May, 1973, in response to Arab military activity, is very disruptive to Israeli social and political processes. Consequently, the Israelis became increasingly hesitant to mobilize in response to what were generally considered Arab bluffs.

The actual crisis which led to the October war began as yet another Egyptian mobilization, announced by Cairo on 1 October, 1973. This "practice" mobilization culminated with an attack on Israeli positions on 6 October. In contrast to the 1967 war, therefore, the crisis period

preceding the actual hostilities was much shorter, and the extra-regional involvement was virtually non-existent. On 3 October, a meeting was held at Israeli Prime Minister Meir's home in Jerusalem, at which Arab intentions were discussed.²⁰

At this meeting, a preliminary decision was taken not to mobilize the Israeli Defense Forces, considering the criticism which the May mobilization had provoked. The general belief was that the probability of war was quite low and that the Arabs' actions were but another example of their program of psychological and economic pressures on the Israelis. There was also a general feeling amongst the Israeli leadership that the Soviet Union would discourage its Arab clients from a full scale war in the interests of Soviet-American detente. (In this, they seemed to have credited the Soviets with greater leverage over their subsystemic clients than the United States had theretofore been able to achieve over Israel.) Finally, it was believed that if the Arabs did attack, it was likely to be in the form of a limited strike, aimed at easing Arab domestic political pressures, and that such a strike could easily be repelled by the IDF's standing army.

As for the nature and extent of Soviet arms in Egypt and Syria, these were well known to both American and Israeli intelligence, however, it was felt that the Soviets would curtail their resupply of parts and supplies if they assessed war to be imminent.

On 4 October, Soviet advisors and their families were airlifted out of Egypt, an act which did not fit into the pattern of previous Egyptian military maneuvers. Wagner asserts that this action was made to "fit" the perceptions of the Israeli leadership as but another manifestation of the deteriorating Arab-Soviet relationship rather than as a prelude to war.²¹ General Chaim Herzog, on the other hand, said that the Israeli intelligence community had other thoughts on the subject:

"The explanation of all these Soviet moves by Israeli intelligence was: either they indicated a knowledge on the part of the Soviets that war was about to break out (and the evacuation and naval withdrawal might be a Soviet move designed to deter the Egyptians from such action, since at the end of the 'year of decision' in 1971, during a previous general mobilization in Egypt, Soviet vessels had evacuated the port of Port Said); or it might be that the Egyptians, together with the Syrians had finally decided to liquidate Soviet presence in Egypt, although this did not seem very feasible."²²

Heikal, in his book, The Road to Ramadan²³ describes President Sadat himself as being somewhat surprised and confused concerning the Soviet withdrawal. According to Heikal's account, Sadat had decided to see the Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Vinogradov, on 1 October in order to give him a general warning that a break of the cease-fire was to take place. Sadat had apparently decided to tell the Soviets when the attack would occur for two reasons: (1) He did not wish to embarrass the Soviets once the fighting had begun using weapons supplied by them by letting it leak that they knew when the attack was planned, and (2) he feared that

the Soviets might leak the information to the United States in order for them to put pressure on the Israelis while the Soviets pressured their clients into not attacking.

At any rate, on Thursday, 4 October, the Soviet ambassador returned with an urgent message from the Soviet leadership. According to Sadat, Vinogradov conveyed Moscow's request that he "allow four big aircraft to arrive in Egypt to fly the Soviet families out of Egypt. They want them to land at a military airfield so as not to be seen at the international airport and to maintain secrecy." Sadat considered this a bad omen and was concerned about his request to the Soviets for a commitment to support the Arabs in the war. This apparent lack of confidence on the part of the Soviets was even more obvious in their action of diverting a supply ship bound for Alexandria away from the Egyptian port until it was confirmed that the Egyptians were winning.²⁴

It is possible, but not proven, that the Soviet evacuation was meant to be a signal to the United States that war was imminent. The signal was passed for the following reasons: (1) The Soviets doubted the Arab's ability to successfully conduct a major military campaign against the Israelis. (2) In view of their already weakened position in the area, another crushing Arab defeat, such as in 1967, would have been disastrous for Soviet attempts to maintain influence in the region. (3) They could not afford politically to openly express their doubts to their clients,

for to do so might have been interpreted as a sign that (a) The Soviet arms transfer program was insufficient to provide an adequate capability to successfully engage Israel, or (b) they did not believe that the Arab military forces had either the necessary expertise or the will to fight to insure victory. (4) They hoped that the United States would be able to pressure Israel into movement towards accommodation with Arab demands, and thus avoid confrontation.

If, however, the Soviet move was meant as a signal, there is ample reason to believe that it was not received by the parties to whom it was sent. The outbreak of the war on 6 October placed the United States and the Soviet Union in a "micro-version of their larger Prisoner's Dilemma supergame in which detente represents a mildly cooperative solution."²⁵ The choice between them was whether to cooperate and mutually attempt to restrain the combatants, or to unilaterally defect and aid their respective clients. It appears that the Soviets were the first to defect by not informing the United States in advance of the Arab intent to attack.²⁶ When the United States did find out that war was imminent -- only three or four hours in advance -- it kept its part of the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev agreement by contacting the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Soviets to see if war could be prevented. But it was too late. At eight o'clock that morning the Syrians attacked Israel from the north and the Egyptians attacked from the south.²⁷ In response to Kissinger's request, Soviet ambassador Dobrynin pledged cooperation and pledged similar efforts

to restrain the regional actors. Sadat does report Soviet pressure on him to accept a cease-fire soon after the war had begun, but also mentions the Soviet pledge to construct an "air bridge" by which to mount resupply operations.²⁸ After the initial Arab successes, furthermore, the Soviets "defected" at two different levels: first, by urging new Arab states to join in the fighting, and then by increasing the rate of arms transfers to the Arabs. The United States did not "counterdefect" immediately to the increased Soviet participation, and, in fact, suggested cooperation with a mutual arms embargo.²⁹ After the Soviets rejected this proposal, the United States greatly increased its shipments to Israel.³⁰ It was not until after the Israelis had crossed the Suez Canal and threatened another crushing Arab defeat, that the two super-powers began to cooperate.

On 16 October, Premier Kosygin flew to Cairo for three days of talks, and Kissinger, at the request of the Soviets, flew to Moscow on 20 October, in order to, in Brezhnev's words, "discuss means to end hostilities in the Middle East."³¹ The result of the Moscow meeting was the jointly sponsored UN resolution 338, which called for a cease-fire in compliance with UN resolution 242. Although the resolution was passed on 22 October, fighting continued, as the Israelis threatened to destroy the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, and continued their advance on the West Bank. The Soviets considered this a United States "defection" -- the United States had promised to control the Israelis

and was not doing so. Consequently, on 24 October, the Soviets proposed joint U.S. -Soviet intervention to enforce the cease-fire, which, in practice, would have meant jointly forcing the Israelis to pull back. A second note was sent the same day which threatened Soviet unilateral intervention if the Americans did not wish to cooperate.³² While it is possible that the Soviets believed that joint intervention was in keeping with the spirit of detente, it is unlikely that they would have believed that the United States would agree to their unilateral intervention. It appears that the unilateral proposal was a threat intended to get the United States to increase pressure on the Israelis to move back to the cease-fire line. Whatever the Soviet intentions, however, the United States perceived the Soviet proposals as "defection" and not "cooperation." As a result, the United States responded with a nuclear alert and a bluntly worded warning to Brezhnev.³³ That the nuclear alert was designed as much to communicate American intentions to the Israelis as to the Soviets, is demonstrated in this passage from E. R. F. Sheehan's The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger³⁴

"The 'nuclear alert' appeared at the time to be a deus ex machina to divert attention from the domestic crisis of Watergate, but in truth it was part of the elaborate game Dr. Kissinger was playing with the Russians, the Israelis, and the Egyptians. In subsequent conversations with aides, Kissinger sought to justify his decision by calling it 'our deliberate overreaction.' He had warned the Russians throughout the war that the United States would not tolerate an intervention by Soviet troops. The American alert dramatized that point. But the alert was aimed at Israel as well -- to manifest emphatically that,

whilst Washington would not countenance this Russian threat to shed Israeli blood, Israel must reciprocate by accepting American political imperatives and sparing the Third Army. Within a day, the Russians backed off. So did the Israelis, and the Third Army was spared."

With the passage of Security Council resolution 339, a second cease-fire more or less came into effect and gradually the fighting on the Egyptian front came to an end. Fighting continued, however, on the Syrian front, intermittently, until a cease-fire was finally achieved on 31 May, 1974.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

If the Six Day War resulted in increased Soviet influence in the Middle Eastern subsystem, the war of October, 1973, saw Soviet influence reach its nadir. It is interesting to note the seeming perversity in the changing fortunes of the major systemic actors in the Middle East. After the war of 1967, a defeat for the Soviet supplied Arabs, Soviet influence and prestige in the region nevertheless increased. The 1973 war may be claimed as an Arab victory, and yet, the influence of the Soviets has diminished. The reason for this apparent paradox is not at all clear, yet it seems to be independent of the respective military fortunes of the protagonists, and tied, instead to the regional political subsystem.

In the 1967 war, Nasir was thrust into a conflict for which he was ill-prepared. Consequently, American support for Israel, coupled with

Arab public denials of defeat and the need for replenishing the Arab arsenal, led to the emergence of the Soviet Union as the dominant systemic power in the region. The 1973 war, on the other hand, was undertaken for entirely different reasons. In the latter case, one of the major objectives of the Arab leadership, notably Sadat, was to bring the United States into closer proximity to the problem of the Arabs, specifically the question of occupied territories. Consequently, despite bellicose pronouncements to the contrary, it is probable that military "victory" was never the goal, and consequently, a stalemated ceasefire which had brought the United States into the conflict in the role of constraining its Israeli clients could easily be construed as an Arab victory, leading to the exploitation of renewed American interests in the region.

One manifestation of this renewed American interest was the "shuttle diplomacy" undertaken by Secretary of State Kissinger, aimed at obtaining a disengagement of forces and an incremental approach to a peace agreement.³⁵ It should be noted that Kissinger saw his Middle Eastern diplomatic initiatives from the standpoint of global politics vis a vis the Soviets, but yet was constrained to undertake them in consonance with the essential rules of the subsystem.

SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the transformation of the war for Palestine from a regional conflict, peripheral to the major channels of interaction between the essential systemic actors of the day

(and when dealt with at all, dealt with in the terms of the global international system) to a conflict which has intimately involved the contemporary major bloc actors, sometimes involuntarily, and on terms which reflect the processes and structures inherent in the regional subsystem. Although the system of interaction between global and regional actors is dominated by the essential rules of the subsystem, this does not preclude shifting initiatives between the global and regional actors as they attempt mutual exploitation.

For example, the Arabs, in initiating the 1973 war, planned to refocus global interest on the core issue of controversy within the subsystem -- the status of Israeli occupied territories, and the plight of the Palestinian Arabs. They counted on the United States/Soviet Union competition for influence in the region to prevent the destruction of their respective client states. Consequently, they were willing to launch the campaign despite asymmetries in the pattern of arms supplies to the region. The Soviet program of arms transfer was not designed to supply their Arab clients with a credible offensive posture against Israel, while the arms transfer program of the United States to Israel was, in fact, designed to be used to obtain an Israeli victory over the Arabs in any probable conflict. Nevertheless, the Arabs were not deterred from launching an all out attack against Israel, since their own defeat was never really at risk as long as the systemic actors could be relied upon to intervene to prevent the destruction of their respective client states.

In the case of the cease-fire of 1973, however, the initiative was that of the global powers. The threatened Soviet unilateral intervention had prompted the U.S. nuclear alert and increased pressures on Israel to cease fighting. It is conceivable that without such external pressures, the war would have continued and grown in intensity. Had the Israeli threat to annihilate the Arab forces proceeded unhindered by the United States, it is likely that the Soviets would indeed have acted unilaterally. The scenario following such an intervention could easily have involved the deployment of American forces within the region, and the possibility for escalation into a global nuclear conflagration.

... has synthesized that the contemporary pattern of relations between the global system and the Middle East regional subsystem is subsystemically dominated, what follows is a brief outline of some of the factors contributing to this situation.

MIDDLE EAST OIL

Although an Arab embargo had been placed on the shipment of petroleum to the West during the Six Day War, the embargo deployed during the 1973 war was much more effective. Some of the reasons for the difference of effectiveness were that in 1967 Saudi Arabia cut off the flow of oil involuntarily under pressure from Nasir, and consequently did not enforce the measures as strictly as possible, and resumed shipments as soon as possible.³⁶ In 1973, on the other hand, Saudi Arabia introduced the weapon of its own accord. Further, increasing governmental

participation in the oil producing companies as well as substantial price increases in the meantime, made it easier for the oil exporting countries to economically weather a cut in international trade. One other factor influencing the Saudis new willingness to use the oil weapon is that with Nasir's death, they felt less threatened that some other Arab leader would appropriate to himself the right to decide where and when the oil weapon should be used.

Regardless of the proximate motivation for deciding to use the oil weapon, once the Arab states had decided to use it, they did so most effectively. All earlier price increases were dwarfed by those of mid-October, 1973 which raised the posted price of marker crude from \$3.01 per barrel to \$5.12 per barrel, and by those of late December (effective 1 January) which raised the price to as much as \$11.65 per barrel. Oil shipments were embargoed to the United States and to the Netherlands, and to certain other countries. Production was cut by 25%, and further monthly incremental cuts of 5% were threatened. Although only the Arab producers of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi) fully applied the production cuts and embargo, while Libya and Algeria applied them unevently, and Iraq hardly at all, oil supplies in international trade nevertheless decreased from 33 million barrels per day in September 1973, to 28.8 million barrels per day in November of that year.³⁷ Although only the Arab countries, supporting the campaign against Israel, fully supported the embargo and production cutbacks,

all of the oil producing and exporting countries took advantage of the price increases. Thus, economic forces set in motion in accordance with the rules of the Middle Eastern subsystem permeated the entire international market for petroleum, and, consequently, impinged upon not only the major systemic actors, but other regional subsystems as well.

It was against this background that Kissinger began his "shuttle diplomacy." The lifting of the oil embargo was always high on the agenda of any talks he had with the Arab leaders. The United States' effort to resupply Israel during the conflict had been complicated by the reluctance of its Western European allies to provide landing rights and logistic support for the airlift, lest they be dealt yet another blow by the Arab oil weapon. This placed severe strain upon the NATO alliance itself. Consequently, the oil embargo was inextricably linked to Kissinger's peace initiatives.

According to Sheehan, part of the bargain that Kissinger struck with Sadat concerning the Sinai Disengagement included an agreement that Sadat would use his offices to attempt to persuade the oil ministries to end the embargo. With no lifting of the embargo forthcoming, Kissinger supposedly played "impeachment politics," warning that a continued embargo would so weaken the American President politically, that he would be unable to promote peace in the region. Sheehan goes on to say that when Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf and Egyptian Foreign Minister

Fahmy visited Washington in 1974 they told Nixon and Kissinger that if they (the U.S.) would do something for Syria, the embargo would stop. Kissinger promised to try, and in March the Embargo was lifted. "Kissinger subsequently denied the 'linkage' but in fact his Syrian shuttle was the price he paid to end the embargo."³⁸

The oil politics of the early 1970's, while effective, might be compared to the present day Arab economic leverage as barter might be compared to today's money markets. During the embargo period, the political leverage which was applied had to do almost exclusively with a source of energy, for which alternatives might be substituted. As the Western powers, either through perversity or through shortsightedness failed to develop appropriate substitutes for Middle East oil, the economic influence which the Arabs were able to exert became less and dependent on one specific commodity, and became based, instead, upon the influence which the newly wealthy Arab countries might exert upon various world currencies, including the dollar itself.

To try to put the shifting economic locii of the world in some perspective, it might be useful to review some pertinent facts concerning Arab oil wealth. In 1976 alone, the Saudi oil industry (representing 1% of the workforce and about 90% of the Gross Domestic Product) earned about \$37.8 billion, or just over \$100 million per day. At this rate, the Saudis would be able to buy:³⁹

All the stock on the United States stock exchanges (market value) in 26 years, 5 months, 14 days.

The fortune 500 companies (total tangible net worth) in 9 years, 8 months, 9 days.

A reciprocal concept to the great deal of wealth that the oil exporting Arab states are amassing is that, as more of their foreign reserve holdings are in American dollars, the greater the interest which the Arabs will have in maintaining the value of the dollar in the international money market. Thus the economic relationships between the Arab world and the West have been transformed from colonial exploitation, through Arab challenge, to a situation of mutual interdependence. Therefore, although increasing systemic reliance of Middle Eastern oil has increased the ability of the Arab oil exporting states to focus systemic interest on subsystemic issues, the revenue from petroleum has bound the exporting countries to the international monetary system, and, in so doing, may be a major factor in constraining the petroleum exporters from undertaking precipitous action based upon and utilizing their oil power.

The increasing economic strength of the Arab oil exporting countries is not without its effect upon the world arms market, as the following section will discuss.

ARMS TRANSFERS REVISITED

It is unlikely that the arms transfer policies of the extra-regional suppliers did much to either incite or to prevent the outbreak of war.

Yair Evron cites the 1956 Suez conflict as the only Arab-Israeli beligerency in which arms trade (the 1955 Czech arms deal) had a major influence.⁴⁰ Consequently, he doubts some of the claims that have been made about the ability to inhibit conflict through "arms control," if by arms control is meant measures taken in the military sphere -- for example, in terms of weapon systems, sizes of armies, or demilitarized territory -- that is likely to increase the strategic stability of relations between the states in conflict. A stable mutual deterrence system between states in conflict can contribute to that strategic stability. However, in the system of Arab-Israeli relations from 1967 to 1973, although Israel's apparent military superiority should have provided a deterrent vis-a-vis Egypt, a stable system of strategic relations did not emerge. Since 1967, in fact, two difficult wars have erupted: the "war of attrition" and the October 1973 war. Evron attributes the lack of strategic stability during this period to another factor which he calls "grievance,"⁴¹ and points to the Israeli's retention of the Sinai and presence along the Suez Canal as being the factors which resulted in an Egyptian grievance which "transcended any possible Israeli deterrent aspect and was the factor that undermined the system of strategic relations. The final result of this destabilization was the 1973 war."⁴²

If, because of the concept of "grievance," the relative military positions of the regional protagonists is of minor importance in determining whether or not open hostilities arise, what influence can the

extra-regional actors exert over their arms recipients once the fighting has begun? The 1973 war does not provide any empirical data in this regard since, as has been demonstrated, both major suppliers "defected" and furnished their clients with massive resupplies of arms. Since that time, moreover, arms transfers have increased so that Israel, and to a lesser degree some of the Arab countries may now be said to have amassed stockpiles of weapons upon which to draw in the event of another round of war. Given this stockpile, it is unlikely that an extra-regional arms embargo, alone, would result in any immediate influence over a client state's actions. Likewise, the development of alternate sources of supply, and in the case of Israel, the growth of an indigenous arms industry have also increased the regional autonomy of action vis-a-vis the systemic actors. The increasing wealth of the Arab oil exporting states has contributed to the increasing subsystem autonomy by encouraging arms suppliers, notably the United States as largest consumer of Saudi petroleum, to use arms sales as a means of recycling petrodollars. Further, the purchase of sophisticated weaponry, such as the F-15 fighter aircraft, by the Arabs, has the effect of driving down the cost of acquisition of that system by the United States military; and, in times of budgetary constraints, such an effect may be a powerful inducement to sell such sophisticated systems on the terms of the recipient, without much concern for overall politico/military planning.⁴³

The recent controversy over the Carter administration's proposed "package deal" of aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, is

demonstrative of the extent to which subsystemic influence has been able to penetrate the American decision making process. Recent political initiatives taken by the moderate Arab leadership, especially by Sadat, put pressure on the administration to demonstrate some support for the Arab position. The manner in which this support was to be demonstrated was through the arms transfer package. The linkages between the growing political independence of the regional actors and the United States' response will be discussed in the following section.

SUBSYSTEMIC POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

The Arab oil embargo, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, the election of Israeli Prime Minister Begin, and the Sadat visit to Jerusalem, are all manifestations of the growing political independence of the subsystemic actors. To an increasing degree, systemic interaction with the Middle East subsystem occurs according to the essential behavioral rules of the subsystem. Thus Sheehan⁴⁴ points out that although Kissinger saw his peace shuttle between the regional antagonists from a systemic viewpoint; the position of the United States in the region relative to that of the Soviet Union, and the elimination of the oil embargo which was threatening the solidarity of one of the bipolar blocs; his dealings with the regional actors took place within the context of the regional political subsystem. As was mentioned earlier, the price of lifting the oil embargo was his trip to Damascus, a trip suggested by the Saudis, as necessary to keep Assad within the influence of the moderate Arab camp. Consequently, much of Kissinger's time was spent re-assuring the Arab

leaders about matters of intra-Arab rivalry and mutual distrust. As a result, Kissinger's diplomacy proceeded on two levels. The first was the containment of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the second was the promotion of American technology, which all the Arabs wanted, and which allowed him time to work on the first problem. According to Sheehan,⁴⁵ he was, in effect saying to the Arabs "I know what you want -- your territory -- and I'm working on it. Meanwhile I'll give you everything else you want to compete in the twentieth century." This has meant a vast commitment to the Saudis to play a major part in fashioning their "infrastructure" and to supply arms. For the Egyptians, this policy has meant American diplomatic support, money, and the encouragement of American investors and of the Arab oil exporting countries to help rescue the Egyptian economy. It also has meant the encouragement of Western Europe to sell arms to Sadat, and has now even involved the United States in direct sales. This policy has been extended to the more militant states, such as Syria and Iraq, who although they still depend upon Soviet weapons, are beginning to import American technology.

As for his dealings with the Israelis, Kissinger's tactics to convince them to accept the provisions of the Sinai Disengagement agreement of 1975 involved an explicit agreement that:

"... The United States will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation, on an ongoing and long term basis, to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements, and to its economic needs."⁴⁶

The 1977 election of Menachem Begin and his Likkud coalition to head Israel's government was but another example of the region's growing political independence. Although Rabin has been implicated in scandal which may have added to voter dissatisfaction with the Labor Party, the election of Begin was a break not only with a political party but with a "European" political connection. Begin and his conservative policies represent a distinctly regional approach to the problems of regional security and have few philosophical connections to the global system. In addition, after Begin's assumption of power, Israeli settlement in occupied territory increased in pace, despite U.S. pressure to the contrary. Once again, regional political activity is dominated by a political philosophy which is the product of the regional political relationships, as well as normatively charged with a religious tie to the land. Consequently the odds for a negotiated settlement based on systemically negotiated or guaranteed compromise, based on instrumental values rather than consummatory values, appear to have diminished.

Finally, just as Sadat delivered a "shock" to the international system in 1973 by launching a military campaign against Israel, so, too, did he "shock" the system by his trip to Jerusalem in 1977. In Sadat's words, in appraising the impasse in peace negotiations which had prevailed since Sinai II:

"I realized that we were about to be caught up in a vicious circle precisely like the one we'd lived through over the last thirty years. And the root cause was none other than that very psychological barrier I have referred to."⁴⁷

It should be pointed out that the Sadat visit to Jerusalem followed hard on the bilateral declaration of Carter and Brezhnev for a reconvening of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. It is quite likely that Sadat, seeing the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict drifting back toward systemic negotiations and compromise, decided to make his trip in order to once again refocus the problem on the subsystemic level. In doing so, he effectively "stole the thunder" from the U. S. -Soviet proposal and reinforced the regional nature of the conflict and the need for regionally derived solutions to it. He accomplished another task in his peace initiative: by going to Israel and conceding its right to exist, he had made a substantial concession to the Israeli position. In so doing, and after his oft repeated remark that the United States holds "99% of the cards," in the search for a settlement, he has clearly placed pressure on both Israel and the United States to reciprocate by making some sort of territorial gesture to the Arab position.

After the euphoric visit to Jerusalem and talk of imminent peace, no substantive progress was made at achieving a peace settlement. The language used by both sides became so bitter, in fact, that Sadat broke off negotiations. At the same time, Israel continued its settlement program in the occupied territories.

Sadat's trip was roundly criticized by the more militant Arab leaders, even before its completion. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, among others, severely criticized the initiative. When no reciprocal concessions appeared to be forthcoming from the Israelis, the United States was placed in the position of having to express some tangible support for Sadat and the Arab position. As a result, the United States Administration agreed to the transfer of sophisticated fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and, more importantly, the transfer of combat aircraft (F-5 Fighters) to the Egyptian government. Whether these transfers would have been proposed without the independent political initiatives taken by Sadat, or in the context of Israeli territorial concession is problematical.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST PRIOR TO OCTOBER WAP

Country/Aircraft type	1967-8 ^a	1968-9	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-7-	1973 ^b
Egypt							
MiG 21 Interceptor	100	110	100	150	200	200	210
MiG 19 Fighter	45	80	---	---	---	---	---
Su-7 Fighter /bomber	---	40	90	105	110	120	80
MiG 15 Fighter	(60	120	120	165)	---	---	---
MiG 17 Fighter /bomber	(40	30	28	200	200	200
Il-28 Light bomber	20	40	30	28	25	10	5
Tu-16 Medium bomber	---	10	12	15	18	18	25
MiG, Yak, L-29 Trainers	---	---	---	---	---	---	200
Total	225	400	352	463	553	568	620
Syria							
MiG-21 Interceptor	---	60	55	90	100	140	200
Su-7 Fighter /bomber	---	20	20	40	30	30	30
MiG 17 Fighter /attack	---	---	---	---	---	80	80
MiG 15 Fighter	25	70	70	80	80	---	---
Il-28 light bomber	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Total	25	150	145	210	210	250	310 ^{c-d}
Jordan							
Hunter Ground Attack	---	12	11	20	18	35	32
F-104A Fighter /bomber	---	---	---	18	15	15	20
F-86	---	4	---	---	---	---	---
Total	---	16	11	38	33	50	52 ^e

Country/Aircraft Type	1967-8	1968-9	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973
Iraq							
MiG 21 Interceptor	50	60	60	60	85	80	90
Su-7 Fighter/bomber	---	20	20	50	48	48	60
MiG 19 Fighter	(34	45	45	45)	---	---	30
MiG 17 Fighter/bomber	(8	8	8	9	9	---
Tu-16 Medium Bomber	6	10	10	10	12	---	8
Il-28 Light bomber	10	50	50	36	35	32	---
Hunter Ground Attack	50	20	20	20	16	---	36
T-52 Light strike	20	213	213	229	220	189	---
Total	170	213	213	229	220	189	224
Libya							
Mirage V and 111B/C/E attack & Interceptor	---	---	---	---	---	72	1108
F-5A Interceptor	---	---	---	7	7	10	9
Total	---	---	---	7	7	82	119
Algeria							
MiG 21 Interceptor	---	(140	140	140)	30	30	35
MiG 15/17 Fighter/bomber	---	---	---	---	60	95	95
Su-7 Fighter/bomber	---	30	30	30	24	---	20
Il-28 Light bomber	---	---	---	---	28	20	30
Magister armed trainer	---	170	170	170	142	181	26
Total	---	170	170	170	142	181	206
Saudi Arabia							
BAC-167 ground attack	---	---	---	24	20	20	---
Lightning fighter	4	24	28	35	20	35	---
Hunter Ground Attack	4	4	4	---	---	---	---
F-86	12	11	11	16	15	15	---
Total	20	39	43	75	55	70 ^h	---

Country/Aircraft Type	1967-8	1968-9	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973
Israel							
F-4 Fighter/Interceptor	---	---	---	36	75	120	127
A-4 Fighter/bomber	---	48	48	67	72	125	162
Mirage III Fighter/bomber	65	65	65	60	60	50	35 ^f
Barak Fighter	---	---	---	---	---	---	25
Vautour light bomber	15	15	15	12	10	10	12
Mystere IVA Fighter/bomber	25	35	35	30	27	27	23
Super Mystere Intercept.	25	15	12	10	9	9	18
Magister armed trainer	50	65	65	85	85	85	85
Oragan Fighter/bomber	50	45	35	30	30	30	30
Total	230	288	275	330	368	430	517

- a. Data in this table from 30 June to 30 June.
- b. 1973 figures represent appx. strengths at outbreak of hostilities.
- c. Estimated between 15-20 (see Military Balance 1973-'74, p. 36).
- d. Syria may also have some Su-20's.
- e. 86 F-5E's on order.
- f. Does not include Tu-22's flown to Iraq by Soviet pilots.
- g. France reportedly delivered the last of the 110 Mirages in March 1974.
- h. 140 F-5E's on order.
- i. "Barak in Combat," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 October 1973, p. 12.

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1967-1968 (London, 1967) and succeeding issues through 1973-1974.

NOTES - VI

1. As cited by Polk, p. 255.
2. Safran, p. 404.
3. For a treatment of the Importance of Jerusalem to the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Richard H. Pfaff, Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement, (Washington D. C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969).
4. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2253 (17 June, 1967) as cited in Ibid., p. 38.
5. Ibid., p. 39.
6. For an interesting account of the birth of the resolution, see Lord Caradon, "Is Peace Possible? What are the Options?" in Seymour Finger ed. The New World Balance of Power in the Middle East: Reality or Mirage? (Cranbury N.J. : Associated University Presses, 1975), pp. 217-221.
7. Cited in Lacqueur, The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 373-374.
8. Address by Secretary of State William Rogers, 9 December 1969, United States Department of State Bulletin, (December 1969).
9. Lenczowski (1971), pp. 150-151.
10. SIPRI Arms Transfer Registers. 1976, pp. 53-55.
11. For a detailed account of the weapons used by both sides during the war of attrition, see Edgar O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-1970 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974)
12. Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (New York: The Readers Digest Press, 1976), p. 19.
13. Roger Pajak, "Soviet Arms and Egypt," Survival (July/August 1975), p. 167.
14. Ibid., and Sheehan, p. 20.

15. O'Ballance, pp. 80-81.
16. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
17. Newsweek, 14 April, 1973.
18. Pajak, p. 169.
19. Wagner, p. 150.
20. This discussion of Israeli perceptions of Arab intent was drawn from Wagner, pp. 151-152.
21. Ibid.
22. Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 48.
23. Mohammad Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, (London: William Collins Sons and Co., 1975), pp. 14-26.
24. Anwar el Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 247.
25. Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 447.
26. That the Soviets did, in fact, know of the Arab plans a few days prior to their implementation is confirmed by Sadat, Heikal, Safran, Sheehan, among others.
27. Richard Nixon, p. 921, and Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger (New York, Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 40-41.
28. Sadat, pp. 252-254.
29. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, "Twenty Days in October," New York Times Magazine, 23 June 1974.
30. For several accounts of the American bureaucratic processes which led to the resupply effort to Israel, see Golan, pp. 45-62; Sheehan, pp. 33-34, 37-39; and Nixon, pp. 924, 926-927.
31. Newsweek, (29 October 1973), p. 32.

32. New York Times, 21 November 1973, p. 17.
33. Much of the interpretation of the October 1973 events and their relationship to the prisoner's dilemma games is drawn from Snyder and Diesing, pp. 447-448.
34. Sheehan, p. 38.
35. For a definitive account of Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy, see Ibid., passim.
36. Nadav Safran, "The War and the Future of the Arab Israeli Conflict," Foreign Affairs (January 1974), p. 219.
37. New York Times, 24 November, 1973, p. 8.
38. Sheehan, p. 116.
39. Peter A. Iseman, "The Arab Ethos," Harpers (February 1978), p. 40.
40. Yair Evron, "Arms Races in the Middle East and Some Arms Control Measures Related to Them," in Sheffer, ed., p. 126.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 127.
43. Tom Gervasi, "Eagles, Doves, and Hawks," Harpers, (May, 1978).
44. Sheehan, passim.
45. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
46. United States-Israel Memorandum of Agreement Accompanying the second-stage Sinai Disengagement of September, 1975, Article 1.
47. Sadat, p. 302.

VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

This paper has traced the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has never been free of linkages to extra-regional powers, as it has evolved from a relatively simple regional dispute involving the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine. Upon the creation of the Jewish State in May, 1948, the conflict spread throughout the Middle Eastern Region. The war of 1956 transformed the conflict and linked it inextricably to the rivalries of the two emerging bipolar actors. Both the Six Day War of 1967, and to an even greater extent, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, demonstrate that the United States and the Soviet Union's systemic competition is closely linked to the fundamental subsystemic issue of the region: the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Coincidental to the transformation of the scope and intensity of the dispute, has been the changing character of the international system. Initially, the problem of Palestine could be dealt with according to the essential rules of a "balance of power" global system. The Arab revolt of the 1930's and the mobilization of the Jewish conflict partners posed a challenge to the systemic dominance of the global-regional relationship. This rather diffuse challenge was brought into focus after the creation of the state of Israel and the emergence of independent, revolutionary Arab regimes, such as Nasir's Egypt. In addition, the International

system was transformed from a balance of power system into a bipolar system. Finally, the period from 1967 to the present has witnessed the development of a subsystemically dominated system of relationships between the region and the major systemic actors.

This trend toward subsystemic dominance was largely the result of bipolar systemic competition within the region. As the United States and the Soviet Union each undertook the process of arming their respective clients and using the seemingly insoluble Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of projecting their influence into the area, they also provided the regional actors with the means of increasing their autonomy of action.

To begin with, the arms competition between the two major suppliers led to the stockpiling of weapons by the regional recipients. This stockpiling reduced the effectiveness which any subsequent weapons embargo would have upon the immediate behavior of a client state. Further, the very fact that neither of the two superpowers was prepared to allow the total defeat of a client contributed to the willingness of the regional actors to use the weapons for regional political gain.

In addition, prior to the 1973 war, the pattern of interaction between the regional subsystem and the global system was bifurcated along the lines of the regional conflict. Thus, there was little positive communication between Israel and the Soviet Union, just as the United States' contact with the Arab confrontation states (with the possible exception of

Jordan) was generally acrimonious. These discontinuities of communication resulted in the United States and the Soviet Union having very incomplete information about regional dynamics by which to make policy decisions.

Finally, the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was able to influence the behavior of the United States not so much because of any critical shortage of oil in the United States itself, but because it threatened to weaken the alliance system of which the United States was the leader, and thus increase the relative power of the Soviet alliance system.

The diminution of Soviet regional influence¹ in the wake of the October war, however, and the subsequent improved relations between the United States and the Arab World have presented American decision makers with an opportunity to reverse the trend toward subsystem dominance in its relationship with the region, and to increase the chances for regional stability. It must be made clear, however, that this author sees little chance of returning to the type of systemic dominance which once prevailed during the formative years of the dispute; instead, the best that can be accomplished is that the systemic actor can interact freely with the subsystem and help foster an atmosphere in which the regional actors can arrive at a solution to the problem based on the essential subsystemic rules of behavior. The following sections will present some policy alternatives for the United States which deserve additional investigation.

ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

The recent arms sales package to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel has placed the United States in the position of supplying arms to the two regional protagonists who have been directly involved in every Arab-Israeli war. To those who therefore accuse America of pursuing an amoral "merchant of death" policy as regards arms transfers, it may be argued that the supplying of both sides of a conflict allows the supplier to tailor the arms supply program in such a way as to maintain a measure of stability between the protagonists. An American decision not to supply arms to Egypt, for example, may have actually increased regional instability by (1) posing legitimacy problems for the Sadat regime which may have resulted in the coming to power of a regime less friendly to Western interests which would quite possibly repudiate the current peace initiative, and seek to renew a supplier-client relationship with the Soviet Union, or by (2) resulting in a perceived arms imbalance such that Egypt may have felt constrained to use what weapons it had against Israeli superiority rather than to allow its military position to deteriorate still further. The administration's pledge to supply an additional twenty F-15's to Israel upon completion of the present transfer² was used as an incentive to attain Senate approval (or, more precisely, lack of disapproval) of the package. This pledge may be viewed as the beginning of another round of Middle East arms racing. There are conditions, however, where such racing can have a beneficial effect.

Colin Gray³ suggests that an arms race may provide time for conflict resolution or amelioration processes to work. A continuing arms race keeps alive the hope of victory tomorrow; if the parties are convinced that arms-inventory improvement will yield a better outcome should war come tomorrow, it is unlikely that there will be a war today. This is not to suggest that arms transfer policy is capable of solving the dispute, but it may increase the probability "the system will retain its principal feature."⁴

A danger in the United States pursuing a policy of arms transfers to both sides of the conflict is that it may become a convenient issue for domestic political advantage. If pursued properly, however, it may counter some of the effects of weapons stockpiling, and enhance the United States' ability to, if not prevent, at least limit future armed conflicts between the regional actors.

NEED FOR AN AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY

In a recent interview,⁵ Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, while refusing to link Saudi policy on the dollar and oil prices with the recent aircraft sale, was critical of the U.S. administration for failing to cope with America's energy problems:

"We will do our best to help the U.S. and our other friends in meeting their requirements and overcoming whatever difficulties they may have in this respect. As you know, we decide on the quantity of our oil production according to world need. But the so-called energy crisis is not connected only to the volume of oil production. For example, the U.S., the largest oil consuming nation in the

world, so far does not have any national energy policy. So far as we are concerned, we are always willing to participate effectively in solving any so-called energy crisis, but we cannot shoulder all the responsibility. "

The creation of a national energy policy would have two salutary effects: first, it would, in fact, lessen actual American dependence upon foreign sources of energy, sources which themselves are limited; and second, it would increase Arab trust in the United States as an "honest broker" in the regional dispute. By being able to divorce the current "even handedness" of American Middle East policy from a growing dependence on Arab oil, the United States would be able to respond to those Arab states who remain distrustful of American motives and intentions. Of at least equal importance, such a policy would help to allay the fears of many Israelis as well as large segments of the American political community who feel that U.S. pressure upon Israel to make territorial concessions is motivated primarily by the need to court the favor of the Arab oil exporting states, and that the American commitment to Israeli security, once the concessions have been made, might be bargained away for a barrel of oil. Consequently, a strong American energy policy which incorporated petroleum conservation measures with a search for alternative energy sources would have the effect of in fact reducing the amount of dominance which the subsystem is able to exert over the conduct of American foreign policy, and result in the increased credibility of U.S. regional peace promoting efforts on both sides of the dispute.

PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB - ISRAELI PEACE

This paper began with a brief survey of the cognitive aspects of the Arab-Israeli dilemma. For the most part, the current dispute is still normatively charged with many of the same issues which were mentioned in that chapter: Historical destiny, Religious irrendentism, and Mutual non-recognition. Only recently has progress been made toward the lessening of the mutual non-recognition aspect of the dilemma. On 20 November, 1977, Sadat said to the Israeli Knesset:⁶

"In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with full security and safety. This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change. We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our fears, yes.

"We refused to meet with you anywhere, yes.

"We were together in international conferences and organizations and our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings with you. Yes. This has happened and is still happening.

"It is true also that we used to set as a precondition for any negotiations with you a mediator who would meet separately with each party

"Yet today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice."

Since that act of mutual recognition, the peace process has once again come to an impasse. Given the current trends in the system of relationship between the regional and systemic actors, what role is the United States able to perform in the peace process? To begin with, systemic actors are no longer able to dominate the regional subsystem

as they were during the formative years of the dispute. Consequently, the prospects for achieving peace through the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference, under the auspices of competing systemic actors, and in accordance with the essential rules of a bipolar international system, are not encouraging. Instead, the United States, recognizing the subsystemic nature of the dispute can at best hope to influence the parties to it to resume direct negotiations aimed at an eventual, regionally derived settlement.

Such a comprehensive settlement is not likely in the near future. However it is possible that the United States, through policies such as those outlined above, and through other diplomatic and symbolic initiatives in the region may be able to "keep the lid on" the conflict long enough for genuine concessions to be made by both sides in an atmosphere of mutual security.

The era of direct negotiations between the subsystemic conflict partners has raised the expectations of both sides for some movement toward conflict resolution. If such movement does not occur soon, it may be impossible to prevent yet another bloody war in the region. Sadat has already warned that the October 1973 war may not have been the last if Israel "continues seeking land, expansion, and part of (Arab) sovereignty." His peace initiative, he said, implied that the 1973 war would be the last, but it would not be, if Israel holds "its hard line and does not share in the responsibility of peace."⁷ Sadat has also made

repeated references to the September, 1978 expiration of the American inspired Sinai II disengagement agreement, and his recent actions to suppress his domestic critics suggest the distinct probability that if his political position within Egypt is seriously threatened, he may once again focus internal dissention upon an external enemy.

The task facing the United States, therefore, is to recognize the fact that conflict resolution within the Middle Eastern subsystem is totally dominated by the essential behavioral rules within that subsystem, and the concomitant limitations of systemic actors to directly influence the behavior of the regional actors. By making clear to the regional actors its understanding of the need for regional solutions to regional conflicts, and by its willingness to help foster an atmosphere of mutual security in which the subsystemic rules can operate, will the United States take best advantage of its historic opportunity.

NOTES - VII

1. Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 247-250.
2. Time (22 May 1978), p. 17.
3. Colin Gray, "Arms Races and International Stability," in Sheffer, ed. pp. 62-63.
4. John W. Spanier, Games Nations Play (London: Nelson, 1972), p. 125.
5. Time (22 May 1978), p. 18.
6. New York Times (21 November 1977).
7. Middle East Economic Digest (19 May 1978), pp. 15-16.

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